Lessons Learned Record of Interview

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<th>Project Title:</th>
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<td>Interview Code:</td>
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<td>Date/Time:</td>
<td>April 9, 2015; 11am-12:15pm</td>
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<td>Location:</td>
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<td>SIGAR Attendees:</td>
<td>Candace Rondeaux, Sonia Pinto</td>
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Key Topics:
- ANSF Security Assistance
- MODA Program Design, Support Implementation
- Stabilization Programming, Support and Budgeting

MODA Programming / DSCA Partnering with CTSC-A

DSCA handled MOD/MOI ministerial development and the MODA program from the start. Our partner downrange was NTM-A/CSTC-A. Under Caldwell, when NTM-A started up there was recognition from the outset that there was a need to develop the capacity in the ministries. NTM-A/CSTC-A advocated for greater focus on ministerial needs. We were going to look at the ministerial processes and support mechanisms and personnel issues.

[There was a disconnect and some skepticism around the value of MODA programming in the beginning. The emphasis up to 2010 when the program was started was on troop numbers not building up the bureaucracy that supported ANSF troops.]

I would go down range and I would ask, 'Who is my real interlocutor? Who am I going to engage to make sure that my staff and I have to explain to Washington where we are with this program.
Lessons Learned Record of Interview

Washington was all over the place with NTM-A and CSTC-A and the new APak strategy. But in the beginning under Caldwell within NTM-A CSTC-A the civ-mil emphasis [on security sector reform] worked well because Caldwell basically pinned the rose on his lead civilian [b](3), [b](6), [b](7)(C) and he built out the ministerial programs. Before that we never really had a broad strategy for ministerial development [b](3), [b](6), [b](7)(C)

What we got from the advisory mission was, 'We need to fill in jobs.' It was kind of a form of a whack a mole strategy where they were trying to fill a hole wherever it popped up. Our concept was that you get a great pair of analysts from DOD Comptroller and they work as advisors with MOD directly. But getting that was very hard. Gates sent out a memo pushing for departments to send people for the advisory mission. It basically said, we're in a critical phase of the engagement in Afghanistan. We need to staff this mission and we need you to give colleagues to the advisory mission. But it didn't take at first. The formal gate opened when the directive for the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce was sent out. Undersecretary for personnel Frank Digiovanni [D9 for short] pushed this forward. Petraeus was very big on MODA when he was out there. He said I want 100 MODA civilians in theater. [There was a divide over whether the training mission should be fulfilled by contractors or full time experienced DOD civilians.]

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

The problem with CEW was that when sequestration and budget austerity kicked in when Panetta came into office the DOD bureaucracy was afraid that by letting people go to the field that the positions would dry up. Basically, it was like well, you're letting that person go so it's not a priority position anymore so why don't we cut it. This was an internal bureaucratic sword fight with CAPE and other departments [b](3), [b](6), [b](7)(C)

CEW incubated for a while before anything happened. CEW was never meant to be military embeds. It was about who were our chief bottle washers and dishwashers inside the wire who were going to support training. It was about how to get DOD civilians into the field operating in positions where they could impact the training mission.

There was an effort to bring civilians out the field through periodic engagements with a team of experts where MOD could bounce ideas off of them. It was actually modeled off of a Colombia program where security sector leaders would consult on proposals to do this or that thing or build out a program and there was a sort of murder board process. That was the model but in Afghanistan the problem was you'd have NTM-A and the ministry to thread the needle with and NTM-A did not like these teams coming into the country mucking around in their territory. The thinking was if we use DOD civilians to go out for two years and then come from the comptroller or some other department and they develop a relationship with MOD then that looks like an enduring investment and partnership. We can't control communications and there's going to be messages going up to the NSC that we can't control.
Lessons Learned Record of Interview

ANSF Development Strategy

There’s always a tendency to focus on the numbers side but the presumption is that there are missions and the numbers will be matched to them. Everyone was GWOT focused in the beginning so the ideological support wasn’t there for anything else.

Caldwell and company had some definite allies and with the ASFF funding in place we really got to work on the mission performance and development in the provinces and districts then.

Whenever we would go to the ministries the focus of [Afghan leadership] was on Pakistan. There was definitely a sense that Wardak was thinking about this in terms of the neighbor.

[With the training mission we were trying to think about priorities. When the corruption issue cropped up there saw challenges.] What’s the approach we’re taking here? Are you there to be a whistleblower or are you there to model best practices.

MOD/MOI Leadership View on ANSF and Pakistan and MOI/MOD Relations

The relationship between MOD and MOI was terrible. When we were doing the transition plan we knew there would have to be a green line and blue line planning scenario where you had police doing something at the provincial and district level and the army backing them up along the way.

I always got the sense that at the ministry there was more of an anti-Pakistan focus....I definitely got the impression that there was a needs versus wants challenge. What they wanted was an F-16 to hit their neighbor. What they needed was more along the state building lines. [Strong North Alliance influence and ethnic composition of MOD leadership may have been behind this view.]

I often wondered about the composition of the ministry because you would walk down the hall and you’d see portraits of Massoud in every third office and in the offices where there was no portrait you had to wonder about their affiliation.

We were so focused on the COIN implementation and what that meant that we didn’t really factor this in. And, COIN did legitimate a lot of reconstruction funding. The CERP stuff was all about that and came about in the Bush 43 era and Condi Rice’s narrative that failed states are a threat to us. All that shaped the way the Obama administration viewed the problems.

The feeling at MOD was that those MOI guys are just all over the place. There’s too many organizations within the ministry. There’s corruption and there just this patchwork of organizations that isn’t really coordinated. There was a lot of focus on ALP and building up the force and that didn’t sit well with MOD. Bismillah Khan’s placement over at MOI [in 2010 replacing Atmar] was regarded as a solution to all that.

Competition between IC and SOF/ODA

The challenges with SOF priorities and other government agencies (OGA) didn’t really match up. SOF would say those guys in OGA have great intel but poor situational awareness.

\[(b)(6), \ (b)(7)(C)\] brought his PRT experience to the table and if you look back you can see the similarities. The PRT’s were really about extending the Afghan government writ; it wasn’t just about civilians going out to do development and reconstruction projects.
Lessons Learned Record of Interview

Green on Blue Attacks
The inside the wire threat really had a chilling effect. I still don’t know if it was a all out effort by the Taliban to infiltrate or whether it was really triggered by the exposure of corruption. [references KAIA fatal shooting April 2011]. My impression was that it was the Afghan air force officer who was corrupt and he cracked when he was exposed because he was flying people and goods all over the place.

We didn’t understand the extent of the corruption. There was not enough understanding of the internal workings. We didn’t understand how it worked but what it was a top down pay to play system. The leadership would pay for their jobs and then tax down. It was a tax down, pay up scheme. We just didn’t have a focus on the anthropological aspect of corrupt patronage networks.

[References Dennis Blair testimony on ANSF corruption.]

OHDA vs. CERP
CERP was developed in a warfighting environment and OHDA was developed for emergencies. With CERP it was not meant to be Kajaki Dam stuff. It was meant to be just quick impact stuff