Project Title and Code: SIGAR LL-02: Lessons Learned from Aid Coordination in Afghanistan

Date: February 3, 2015

Interviewees:

SIGAR Attendees: Grant McLeod, Subject Matter Expert / Consultant

Location: Brussels

Purpose:

Non- attribution Basis: Yes X No

Recorded: Yes X No

Recording File Record Number:

Prepared By: Grant McLeod, Subject Matter Expert, Consultant

Summary of Key Discussion:

- It was the aftermath of the elections; AA, Karzai, all sides complained about UN role; Karzai had growing paranoia about the US trying to get rid of him; Thought UN undermined him because they supported the election; Very difficult situation; Karzai wanted UN to be credible; partner to all; against advice; he supported next election; EC was credible, not perfect; Tried not to appear political; IC appeared political;
- Civ/Mil confusion; Security priority number 1; Mind of donors was not to develop; but to ensure environment for its troops; each country felt that aid was buffer of protective around military; Troop protection; Donors do not want to show cards; Don’t want allies to know; not on paper; Don’t want Afghans to know; PRTs are military; Short sighted; Part of budget should be to development; Long term; Consistent; Quick impact was causing confusion;
- UN was expected to coordinate; JCMB coordinated as much as it could; No substance; No questions; Coordination is hard; Some donors don’t know what they are doing; areas that have no way to coordinate; Information share, tell all to coordinator; tried;
- Make a difference on ground by supporting process of transition; Facilitate political side; Development was unrealistic; Need to have a strategy to show the plan; Plan was not realistic; Not focused on corruption;
- Indicate ideal, but be practical; Ideal and possible;

Follow-up:

- None