Project Title and Code: SIGAR LL-02: Lessons Learned from Aid Coordination in Afghanistan
Date: February 27, 2015
Interviewees: [Redacted]
SIGAR Attendees: Grant McLeod, Subject Matter Expert / Consultant
Location: Ottawa
Purpose: To gather small donor perspective of coordination from 2010 - 2014.
Non- attribution Basis: Yes X No
Recorded: Yes X No
Recording File Record Number:
Prepared By: Grant McLeod, Subject Matter Expert, Consultant
Summary of Key Discussion:
- ANDS was considered in Canada's 3-year country strategy, but not the only driver; Military mission, Manley panel, were important; Afghan compact was not primary; Kabul process was real focal point in 2010-11; Quality of the dialogue had improved; What does prioritization mean? Strategies did not speak to each other; 2012 was better aligned; ANDS was normal and required; Nothing unusual; Good document, but needed an action plan;
- 2012 when she came back they had to sort it out; Political and development officials were working together; Division of labor; TMAF regulations were tough; Context of donor countries losing focus and interest in Afghanistan; MOF did not see role in bringing together other ministries; Did not resolve the issue of non-traditional donors; FEFA was a key partner; Afghanistan was on track with other budget in other countries;
- JCMB drove lots of work; Lots got done in the lead up; JCMB added to the agenda, but did not result in much because of the quality of the discussion; UNAMA secretariat function; Gave some advice on Afghan side; Development coordinator; Substantive issues left to donor working groups; Did not leverage the UN system; DAD unworkable in 2010; 2012; Nobody did it; Not smooth; From the beginning;
- For size and scale of the US they were collaborative; Even when they could act alone; AID, State, Treasury, doing lots of coordination; Had lots of expertise; Could get things; Canada can do pilot; US can provide larger program;
- Level of informal relationship building was not possible;
Follow-up:
- None