THE UNIVERSITY

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LIBRARY

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SURVEY

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The Slaveholding Indians

1 i ) As Slaveholder and Secessionist

(2) As Participants in the Civil War

(3) Under Reconstruction

Vol. Ill

The American Indian under Reconstruction

BY

ANNIE HELOISE ABEL, PH.D.

(Mrs. George Cockburn Henderson)

atque ub'i solitudinem faciunt, pacem ap- pellant. — Tacitus, Agricola, cap. 30.

THE ARTHUR H. CLARK COMPANY CLEVELAND: 1925

COPYRIGHT, 1925, BY

ANNIE ABEL HENDERSON

CEDAR RAPIDS IOWA

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TO THE MEMORY OF MY MOTHER

CONTENTS

PREFACE 9

I OVERTURES OF PEACE AND RECONCILIATION . . n

II THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES .... 35

III CATTLE-DRIVING IN THE INDIAN COUNTRY . . 73

IV THE MUSTER OUT OF THE INDIAN HOME GUARDS 99

V THE SURRENDER OF THE SECESSIONIST INDIANS . 127

VI THE PEACE COUNCIL AT FORT SMITH, SEPTEMBER,

1865 173

VII THE HARLAN BILL . . . . . . . 219

VIII THE FREEDMEN OF INDIAN TERRITORY . . . 269

IX THE EARLIER OF THE RECONSTRUCTION TREATIES

OF 1866 301

X NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CHEROKEES . . . 345

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 365

INDEX 379

PREFACE

The present is the concluding volume of the Slave- holding Indians series. Its title may be thought some- what misleading since the time limits of the period covered by no means coincide with those commonly understood as signifying the Reconstruction Period of United States History. In that history, the word, reconstruction, which ought, etymologically, to imply the process of re-building and restoring, has attained, most unfortunately, a meaning all its own, a meaning now technical, nothing more nor less, in fact, than political re-adjustment. It is in the light of that mean- ing, definite and technical, that the limits of this book have been determined.

The treaties made with the great southern tribes in 1866 were reconstruction treaties pure and simple and this volume, therefore, finds its conclusion in their negotiation. They marked the establishment of a new relationship with the United States government; but their serious and far-reaching effects would constitute too long and too painful a story for narration here. Its chapters would include an account of tribal dissensions without number or cessation, of the pitiful racial dete- rioration of the Creeks due to unchecked mixture with the negroes, of the influx of a white population out- numbering and over-reaching the red, and, finally, of great tragedies that had for their theme the compulsory removal of such tribes as the inoffensive Nez Perces, the aggressive Poncas, and the noble Cheyennes.

IO The Indian Under Reconstruction

In recent years, an increasing interest has been aroused in the course of the westward movement so- called and, little by little, the full significance of Amer- ican expansion is being appreciated. In less than a century of time, the United States has extended itself over the vast reaches of this continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific and its territorial growth has necessarily involved the displacement of the aborigines. Its treat- ment of them is bound to concern very greatly the historian of the future, whose mental grasp will be im- measurably greater than is that of the men, who now write and teach American history in the old conven- tional way with a halo around New England and the garb of aristocracy enveloping Virginia. It is in Amer- ican History rightly proportioned that the present study will have its place.

ANNIE HELOISE ABEL

Washington, D.C., March, 1920

I. OVERTURES OF PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

The failure of the United States government to afford to the southern Indians the protection solemnly guar- anteed by treaty stipulations had been the great cause of their entering into an alliance with the Confederacy and it was also the primary cause of their persisting in their adherence to its fortunes. From first to last mil- itary conditions and events determined political and it is certainly no exaggeration to say that had a time ever come after the opening twelvemonth of war when the Federals could have shown themselves in unquestioned possession of the Indian country the treaties with the South would, one and all, have been immediately ab- rogated even by such initial and arch offenders as the Choctaws and Chickasaws who, alone of all the slave- holding tribes, had attached themselves, originally and in a national way, to the Secessionists because of a frankly avowed sympathy with the "peculiar institu- tion." Success wins support everywhere, at all times and under all circumstances. Occasionally a very little of it is necessary, the glamor of the mere name being all-sufficient. It had taken next to nothing to call back the Cherokees to their allegiance to the North, the em- bodiment of the power with which all their other treaties had been made, and, just as the Confederate victory of Wilson's Creek, or Oak Hills, had ter- minated the neutrality that they had hoped, Kentucky- like, to maintain, so the penetration of their country

12 The Indian Under Reconstruction

by a Union force in the summer of sixty-two saw the last of their inclusion as a tribe within the southern league.

During 1863 the example set by the Cherokees was frequently followed, never by tribes, it is true, but by groups of Indians only, large or small. Individuals, families, clans could pass with impunity within the Federal territory whenever such passing appeared to promise a fair degree of personal security. It was contrariwise with nations, the Unionist fortunes of war being as yet too fluctuating for nations to care to take additional risks. None the less the time seemed rea- sonably opportune for friendly advances to be made to repentant tribes and so thought several of the gen- erals in the field, among them Schofield and McNeil.1 In November, the former emphatically asserted that terms of peace might with propriety now be offered and the latter, having already reached the same conclusion, proposed the appointment of a special agent, clothed with plenary power to treat.2 For reasons difficult to enumerate at this juncture no really serious attention was given to the matter by Washington officials until a new year had dawned. Confessedly, the main rea- son was, the continued inability of the Federals to prove military occupancy of the Indian country. Without military occupancy it was worse than useless to make promises of protection. So firmly convinced

1 For an estimate of McNeil's understanding of and sympathy with frontier conditions, see A.G.O., Old Files Section, Personal Papers of John McNeil. McNeil had asked for service in the frontier [S. H. Boyd, Benjamin F. Loan, Joseph W. McClurg to Stanton, March n, 1864, ibid]. He had strong political backing and men like John W. Gamble, J. B. Henderson and J. R. Winchell found justification for even his summary execution of guerrillas at Palmyra. [ibid.]

2 Schofield to Halleck, November 12, 1863, A.G.O., Old Files Section, B 1013, F.S. 1863, Jacket 2 of /5; Usher to Stanton, February 19, 1864, ibid.

Overtures of Peace and Reconciliation 13

of this was Commissioner Dole that, in January, he quite scouted the idea of its being feasible to do much towards reorganization before something more than forts and posts was in Federal possession.3

While taking this stand, as caution dictated it was only right he should, Dole was willing to admit that the facts as alleged by Schofield and McNeil were cor- rect and that Union sentiment among the Indians was very perceptibly on the increase. So excellent an op- portunity, however, for recalling to the minds of con- gressmen and cabinet officials the remissness of the War Department and of the army from the very outset of the war was not to be lost. It was a case, if there ever was one, where reiteration, bold and constant, did no harm. The time was approaching and would soon be here when the United States government and all in authority under it would do well to remember where the blame for Indian defection really lay. Shirkers of responsibility have proverbially short memories.

Yes, Unionist sentiment among the Indians was on the increase * and it was on the increase because the spectre of eventual Confederate failure was looming up ever larger and larger in the distance. The Choc- taws, stanchest of allies once, were now 5 wavering in their devotion to the South but not many of them were as yet fully ready to unite with Abolitionists and Black

3 Dole addressed himself, under date of January 25, 1864, to Congress- man Boyd of Missouri who, from his position on the House Committee of Indian Affairs, had recommended (O.I.A., General Files, Southern Su- perintendency, 1863-1864) a man named Sullivan as an eminently fit person to negotiate with the slaveholding Indians (O.I.A., Letter Book, no. 73,

PP- 54-55-)

4 Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1863, pp. 26, 182, 208, 209.

5 The first signs of their wavering had appeared long since (Abel, The Indian as a Participant in the American Civil War, p. 220) and were subject for detailed comment by Dole in his annual report the preceding year (Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1863, p. 26).

14 The Indian Under Reconstruction

Republicans. Their interests were still, as Commis- sioner Scott had defined them, all southern.6 Their laws were largely derived from the statutes of Missis- sippi,7 whence most of them had come. They were a wealthy people, and largely of the planter class. Race prejudice was strong among them as was also repug- nance to any race mixture that entailed their own as- similation with inferior blood. In this characteristic they resembled the haughty Anglo-Saxon and differed radically from the Gallic Frenchman and, strange to relate, from their own kith and kin, the Creeks, who mingled Indian blood with African freely. All but about three hundred 8 of the Choctaws had gone over to the Secessionists and the tribe had numbered ap- proximately eighteen thousand before the war.9

The first stage in the Choctaw re-tracing of steps would seem to have been marked by the desire for in- activity, the convenient pose of a neutral, and the sec- ond, by a plan to organize an independent Indian con- federacy.10 The principle of self-determination, not christened yet, was dominant throughout the South. It lay back of all secessionist action and ought logically, reasoned the Choctaws, to work as well for red men as for white. Its reductio ad absurdum as the prin- ciple of anarchy par excellence naturally never sug- gested itself to anyone. Possibly, all cogitation was

6 See Address to the Choctaws and others, quoted in Dole's Report for 1863, p. 226.

7 Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1859, p. 160. slbid, 1863, p. 25.

9 August Wattles to Secretary Smith, March 4, 1862, O.I.A., General Files, Central Superintendency, W 528 of 1862; I. D., Register of Letters Received, "Indians," no. 4, p. 517; Wm. P. Dole to Smith, March 17, 1862, O.I.A., Report Book, no. 12, p. 335.

10 Report of Colonel W. A. Phillips, February 16, 1864, Official Records, first series, volume xxxiv, part i, p. 107; Phillips to Dole, February 24, 1864, O.I.A., General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1863-1864, p. 143.

Overtures of Peace and Reconciliation 15

time-serving in character. The discouraged and dis- gusted Indians dallied with ideas of independent sovereignty because it was altogether too early yet for leading Choctaws, prominent half-breeds mostly, to join forces with the detested North. Besides, the In- dian was loath to abandon his erstwhile friend; for the Indian is fundamentally loyal. He keeps faith so long as and often longer than faith is kept with him. Let the Confederates give some evidence of disinterested- ness of motive, of genuine concern for Indian welfare and all might yet be well. Their martial prowess was undoubted, their star of fortune seemed occasionally still in the ascendant; but rally their forces they must. There could be no surer way to a restoration of con- fidence.

The general Indian council that had been regularly meeting at Armstrong Academy was the political body before which to propound the independent confederacy project and it was while that body was holding a session in February11 of 1864 with the object of assisting the

11 The inception of the movement was much earlier and is indicated in the following letter addressed by Jackson McCurtain to General McNeil, December 16, 1863. McNeil had suggested that McCurtain come in person to Van Buren, his headquarters, and discuss the situation in the Choctaw country. McCurtain's absence would have aroused suspicion and he offered as his substitute, "Mr. Thomas Edwards, a citizen of the Choctaw Nation and of Sugar Loaf Co.," where unionist sentiment was slowly germinating. The letter reveals how timorously men like McCurtain were advancing on the return journey to their allegiance to the United States government. It reads as follows:

"We had a meeting on last Saturday, when I proposed to the people that was now camped in the mountains to return to their former homes and not molest or take up arms against the U. S. forces upon con- dition that they would not molest our lives or property. I told the people that I would try and make some arrangement for them to remain at home and be protected, and that no man or citizen of this County to go into the Bush for the purpose of bushwhacking the U.S. forces as they pass through this Nation, and moreover I told them that it was of no use of us following the Confederate States

1 6 The Indian Under Reconstruction

Army any longer. For they have left us to fight for ourselves and I thought it quite time that we ought to come to some terms of agree- ment with the Federals . . . and that I had not the least doubt, but the Gen1 at Fort Smith would reply to our wishes, and it was the wish of the people to form themselves into a home Guard to protect their homes and property against Jay Hawkers and marauding parries who is now in our Country. If this wish meets your approbation and Gen1 it is for you to form your own judgement in regard to a treaty with our Government, as it is out of our power to do anything with a treaty.

"Though I firmly believe as soon as the U. S. forces begin to march through our Country that the Choctaws from all the other Counties will follow the example of this County, and by so doing it will be the means of stiring our Government up to come to terms of a treaty. As we dont wish to be divided like other Nations if we can be saved any other way. As we all come out together and we should all like to come in together. As it never was the wish of the Choctaws at the commencement of this war to take up arms and fight against the U. S. forces, but we were compelled to do so being surrounded by Seceded States and our lives and property taken from us which was threatened. But so long as the Southern forces is in the nation it is impossible for the Choctaws to turn over at the same time, but by working the thing slowly it will succeed in time for it is well known with the people that we can not sustain ourselves without the aid of some other power. Gen1 I wish for you to give me a protection paper and from that paper I can issue to the people of this County or any other County that may submit to my views a ticket with the words (Home .Guards) and (Home Protection) upon so that your forces will know who is soldiers. For every man that belongs to this Guard will have his ticket to show and those that has not is a Enemy to our cause, or any other mode that you might suggest, and Gen1 if it is necessary that you might want to see me, I will try and come out to see you, but as they have got a suspicion upon us in this County, and watching us it is almost impossible to come out at present.

"And Gen1 I am sorry to have to inform you that your last scouting parties plundered a deal of property from our people which they was greatly enraged against, and I hope Gen1 that after these remarks that you will not allow it to proceed but if so we will have to bear it. For it is the means of men turning Bushwhackers and that is a thing I greatly opposed." (A.G.O., Old Files Section, Consolidated Indian Home Guards Papers, B 1013, V. S., 1863).

If Jackson McCurtain was the same as Jock McCurtain, it would seem from the following letter that he was one of those Cooper counted upon. His own guilty conscience must have made him feel that he was under suspicion. He was still on the Confederate side in 1865. "Col.

"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the i8th inst.

Overtures of Peace and Reconciliation 17

Confederates in the rallying of forces 12 that certain Choctaws, who had irretrievably lost confidence in the South and despaired of any course being practicable that did not presuppose the resumption of old-time relations with the United States, attempted to organize an opposition element and to secure an expression of opinion favorable to the immediate repudiation of the Confederate alliance. Calling themselves the Choctaw Nation, de facto and de jure, they met in mass-meeting at Doaksville; but dispersed again on realizing that they were there too near the enemy forces. They re-convened betimes at "Skullyville, twenty miles from Fort Smith," where the Federals were now holding sway.13 Not far from Skullyville was New Hope Academy, a female seminary, which, in the late fifties, had been successfully conducted un- der the auspices of the Methodist Episcopal Church

and enclose special order, No ( ?) from these Hd. Qrs ordering an election for Brigadier Gen. of ( ?) Indian Brigade.

"I always knew you would be firm & true. The Grand Council of the Allied Indian Nations has been ordered to assemble on the loth day of June at Armstrong Academy & until they determine what must be done we must keep the Federals out of the country. You can make requisitions on Col. Walker and draw ammunition for your command.

"The Delegates to the Wild Indian will report to the Grand Council on June xoth.

"It would be well to notify the Federals to keep their troops out of the country until the Grand Council can determine what course to pursue. We do not want any fight with them, under existing circum- stances, but if they disturb any one of the Indian Nations, all will unite in war against them." (D. H. Cooper to Col. Jock McCurtain, May 24, 1865, A.G.O., Confederate Archives, chap. 2, no. 258, p. 36. See also a reference to McCurtain in Cooper to Scott, May 14, 1865, Official Records, vol. xlviii, part 2, p. 1303).

12 Abel, Indian as a Participant in the American Civil War, p. 323.

13 Perkins to Dole, April 18, 1864, O.I. A., General Files, Choctavu, 1859- 1866, P 166; Perkins to Usher, April 18, 1864, I. D. Files, Bundle no. 52 (1864) ; Abel, The Indians in the Civil War, American Historical Review, vol. xv, p. 295, note.

1 8 The Indian Under Reconstruction

South. It now presented itself as a convenient and safe meeting-place and at New Hope, on March four- teenth, a convention of disgruntled Choctaws took drastic action indicative of their weariness of the war and of all that it involved. The following resolu- tions " were unanimously adopted :

Whereas, In entering upon the reconstruction of our Govern- ment in this Nation, we believe that the government of the United States has been an infinite blessing to all parts of this country, and especially to our own Nation, and,

Whereas, Certain portions of the United States have set up their individual rights in opposition to the Federal Government, Be it resolved,

First, That we the citizens of the Choctaw Nation, as well as of the United States, knowing that the Government of the United States must be maintained supreme over the so-called rights of any portion of this country, do, on the part of the Choctaw Nation, utterly disclaim any pretensions to any so- called rights which may be subversive of the rights of the Fed- eral Government, and hold that our primary allegiance is due to the Government of the United States.

Second, Resolved, That we, Citizens of the Choctaw Na- tion, desire the authority of the United States to be vindicated, and the people brought back to their allegiance.

Third, Resolved, That the following named citizens be ap- pointed a committee to select proper men for Provisional Gov- ernor of the Nation, Sec. of State, pro tern., subject to the future vote of the people of the Nation, and a Delegate to represent our Nation at Washington,

(Committee) Jeremiah H. Ward 15 J. G. Ainsworth John Hanaway William P. Merryman J. H. Jacobs

14 O.I.A., Land Files, Choctaw, 1846-1873, Box 38, E 48.

15 The prominence of Jeremiah Ward as a repentant Choctaw and the effect of the Red River disaster upon his tribesmen are indicated in a com- munication from Agent Colman, September i, 1864 [Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1864, pp. 313-314].

Overtures of Peace and Reconciliation 19

Fourth, Resolved, That the thanks of the Convention be and hereby are tendered to Lt. Lindsay and the escort under his command.

WM. F. STEPHENS, Pres't of Convention THOMAS EDWARDS,™ Sec*.

The nominating committee retired and later offered the name of Thomas Edwards for governor, of George W. Boyd for secretary of state, pro tern., and of Edward P. Perkins for delegate. Its report was accepted and the nominations confirmed by the convention.17 Where- upon, the men selected began without further ado to exercise the functions of their respective offices. Ten days subsequently Governor Edwards issued a proc- lamation 18 outlining the new policy.

PROCLAMATION

To the Choctaws, and the Citizens of the Choctaw Nation :

At a Convention held at New Hope, C.N., on March the 1 4th, 1864, by the loyal citizens of your Nation, a preamble of Resolutions were adopted to secure to you the rights and suf- frages which you are entitled to from the Government of the United States.

The last Treaty between the United States and your Nation, which was ratified in 1855, guaranteed to you on the part of the United States Government "protection from domestic strife and hostile aggression," 19 (Treaty 1855, Article xiv) is the only agreement in that treaty wherein the United States has failed to fulfill for the time being her part of the compact ; and though three years have elapsed since the "stars and stripes" was struck down in the Garrison, erected for your defence, by a rebellious and misguided people, that flag again waves in tri- umph over your fortress, and the Government which it repre-

16 Edwards was the man that McCurtain had sent as his substitute to McNeil. See McCurtain to McNeil, December 16, 1863, op. cit.

17 O.I. A., Land Files, Choctaio, 1846-1873, Box 38, E 48.

18 The proclamation as here given is copied verbatim from a printed hand-bill found with Perkins's letter of April 18, 1864.

19 Kappler, Treaties, p. 710.

2O The Indian Under Reconstruction

sents is HERE in full force and power to keep her word and offer you its protection.

The Government of the United States is well aware of the sophistry and eloquence brought to bear upon the minds of your people, by such men as Douglass H. Cooper and Albert Pike to delude you into a treaty with the rebellious confederacy, of which they were the agents ; and can excuse you to a certain extent for an alliance formed when despotism and treason were in your midst. But now that the Government holds indis- putable possession of near four-fifths of your country, it calls upon you to return with truthful allegiance to your natural protector.

The same rights offered to the rebellious subjects of the States by the late Proclamation 20 of the President is guaranteed to you. Three years of strife, misery and want, should at least convince you that the unnatural alliance which you have formed with the enemies of the United States has been one of the heav- iest calamities that ever befel your Nation. They made you brilliant promises, but never fulfilled them. What is your con- dition to-day? The enemy after having swept ruin through your entire land, brought starvation to your very doors, and spread a scene of utter degradation and suffering in your fam- ilies ; have been lying for months on the extreme southern border of your Nation, listening to the first roar of Federal artillery, to flee away and leave you alone. A delegate has been ap- pointed by the Convention to represent your Nation at Wash- ington. Every effort is being made to secure for you your ancient privileges and customs. Citizens of the Choctaw Na- tion, it now devolves upon you to do your part. You were once possessed of the most beautiful country between the Arkansas and Red River. - It can again be yours. Not only your present generation, but your posterity demands that you make a quick and speedy return to that Government which has protected you for over half a century, and secure in the future for yourselves and children what you have lost in the past three years for as-

20 It was not surprising that the Indians readily conceived their case as covered by the amnesty provisions of President Lincoln since neither the original proclamation of December eighth, 1863 nor that of March twenty- sixth, 1864, supplementary and interpretative in character, expressly con- fined those provisions to white men.

Overtures of Peace and Reconciliation 21

sociating with one of the most accursed foes that ever polluted your country.

Citizens, not only your fertile valleys and beautiful hills invite you to the homes which you have deserted, but the Gov- ernment from which you must ever after look to for succor, bids you come. I take this method, in this, my first proclama- tion, to say to all of you who are desirous of possessing the homes which you have abandoned, and re-uniting your alle- giance to the Government, that has ever been your friend, now is your time. You have nothing to fear — and the former bless- ing which you have derived through a friendly intercourse with the United States Government, will again be renewed.

THOMAS EDWARDS, Provisional Governor Choctaw Nation FORT SMITH, ARK., March 24, 1864

The governor's proclamation merits no word of praise. Its spirit is the spirit of the self-seeking, of the abjectly craven, and calls, not for commendation, but for execration. By virtue of its issue, Edwards and his associates put themselves into the position of rats that leave the sinking ship. General Thayer presum- ably sympathised with them and condoned their act since he appears, in the following December, to have honored the governor's requisition for transportation needed for the refugees, who were about to be removed to Fort Gibson ;21 but not so Colonel Phillips. It was not that the doughty Scotchman was averse to what, from his Republican point of view, might be regarded as the political regeneration of the Indians. None had worked harder to reclaim them than had Phillips. He had personally distributed 22 among the rebellious tribes copies of President Lincoln's amnesty proclama- tion,23 notwithstanding that he seriously doubted its

21 Special Orders, no. 225, issued at Fort Smith, December 27, 1864. Ap- parently, the restored Choctaw and Chickasaw refugees were consolidated with the New Hope conventionalists.

22 Official Records, vol. xxxiv, part i, pp. 109, no, in.

23 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. vi, pp. 213-215.

22 The Indian Under Reconstruction

strict applicability to the Indian country. Pioneer and hardy frontiersman though he was, the ex-newspaper correspondent was usually found to be magnanimous where Indians were concerned. Maugre that, he hes- itated not to disparage the work of the New Hope con- vention, contemptuously disposed of Delegate Perkins, protested against the acceptance of his credentials, and ridiculed the authority from which they emanated. In his opinion, the Choctaw Nation was yet de facto rebel and deserving of severest chastisement.24 The minority at New Hope had no official status and were nothing but politic opportunists.25

Anticipated chastisement was the open sesame, the cue to all that had transpired. Because of the prompt and wholesale character of their defection, the Choc- taw had been a tribe especially singled out for condign punishment. It was its funds more particularly that had been those diverted to other uses by act of the United States congress. Recognized as a powerful foe and by many denounced as a treacherous enemy, the Choctaws had virtually none to state their case except traducers. Few there were among western politicians and army men that had the slightest inclination to deal mercifully with them and Colonel Phillips was not of

24 Phillips to Dole, March 22, 1864, O.I.A., General Files, Choctaw, 1859-1866, p. 154. The same letter, with some slight verbal inaccuracies, is to be found in Commissioner of Indian Affairs Report, 1864, p. 328. Mrs. Eaton seems to find in this letter of Colonel Phillips the origin of the sequestration policy of the government (John Ross and the Cherokee Indians, p. 199, note). Her opinion is scarcely warranted by the facts. In April, Phillips reported to Curtis that the Confederate Indians were determined "to try the effect of resistance once more." [Official Records, vol. xxxiv, part 3, p. 53].

25 The United States Senate, however, took cognizance of their action. See Doolittle to Usher, April 28, 1864, enclosing a copy of Senate Resolution, April 20, 1864, relative to the return of the Choctaws to the protection of the Federal government (O.I. A., Choctaiv, D 407 in I. D. Files, Bundle, no. 52 (1864).

Overtures of Peace and Reconciliation 23

that few. His animosity expressed itself in no uncer- tain terms in connection with his denunciation of the New Hope convention; but, perhaps, that was account- able to a sort of irritation caused by the fact that, as he himself reported, the Choctaw was the only Indian nation yet refractory. For the Creek, the Seminole, and the Chickasaw, the war was to all intents and pur- poses over.26 Governor Colbert of the tribe last-named was in Texas. He had fled there "on learning of the defeat at Camp Kansas." 27 Into Texas, by the way, there was now going on "a general stampede." "That a handful of men about Scullyville would like to be the 'Choctaw Nation' " was very "probable and that a portion" who had "not fled from the northern section might be willing to accept an assurance of Choctaw nationality, and pay for acting as militia to expel all invaders" was "also probable;" but, all the same a much larger element, meeting in council above Fort Towson, had not even, so far as Phillips could learn, "made up their minds to accept peace." 28

All plans for the chastisement of recalcitrant Indians took one direction, the direction pointed out by eco- nomic necessity, by political expediency, call it what one will, land confiscation. This was the direction most natural and most thoroughly in accord with his- torical development; but, none the less, it had some special causes. Kansas wanted to divest herself of her Indian encumbrance, from the viewpoint of her politi- cians the reservation system having most signally failed. Never in all history, so it would appear, has the in- satiable land-hunger of the white man been better illus-

26 Report of Colonel W. A. Phillips, dated Fort Gibson, February 24, 1864, Official Records, first series, vol. xxxiv, part i, p. 108.

27 Phillips to Curtis, February 14, 1864, ibid, p. 330.

28 Phillips to Dole, March 22, 1864, op. cit.

24 The Indian Under Reconstruction

trated than in the case of the beginnings of the sun- flower state. The practical effect of the Kansas- Nebraska Act had been to lift an entail, a huge acreage had been alienated that before had been sacred to In- dian claims; white men had swarmed upon the ceded lands; and the Indians had retired, perforce, to dimin- ished reserves. A few short years had passed and now those selfsame diminished reserves were similarly wanted for the white man's use; but the question was, Where next was the Indian to go? South of the thirty- seventh parallel the southern tribes were in possession and they were in possession of a glorious expanse as hermetically sealed to other Indians as it had proved to be to southern projectors, railway and other, before the war. Originally conferred by the United States gov- ernment upon the Five Great Tribes as a sort of in- demnity for the outrageous treatment accorded them east of the Mississippi, it had been conveyed by patent in fee simple and was now held under the most solemn of Federal guarantees. It was to be so held exclusively and inviolably forever.

Prior to the formation of the Indian alliance with the Confederacy, that Federal guarantee of exclusive and inviolable possession had been an insuperable ob- stacle to outside aggression but now all might be changed if only the United States government could be convinced that the great slaveholding tribes had legally forfeited their rights in the premises. In and out of Congress middle-western politicians harped upon the theme but were suspiciously silent on the concomitant theme of Federal responsibility in the matter of render- ing to the Indians the protection against domestic and foreign foes, pledged by treaties. Strange as it may seem they never undertook to consider the question of

Overtures of Peace and Reconciliation 25

Indian culpability in the light of that rather interesting and additional fact.

It was a fact, indisputable, however, and one that Commissioner Dole liked to insist upon, although even he finally succumbed to the arguments in favor of forc- ing the southern tribes to receive other Indians within their choice domain. Dole's change of front came sub- sequent to his visit to Kansas in 1863. On the occasion of that visit it was doubtless borne in upon him that Kansas was determined to accomplish her purpose,29 willy-nilly, and would never rest until she had forced the northern tribes across the interdicted line. Their aversion to removal was somewhat of an impediment; but that she might overcome by persecution. Persecute them she accordingly did and chiefly in the old familiar southern way, by the taxing of their lands, notwith- standing that it was a procedure contrary to the terms of her own organic law.

In his annual report for that year of his western visit, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs advised a concen- tration of the Indians since they seemed not to flourish on small reserves. For the man who had always here- tofore apologised for the conduct of the Indians this was a sort of opening wedge to a complete change of view. By April of 1864 the change had come and Dole had then the conscience to say that he was "un- willing to renew the treaties with those people (the rebellious tribes) especially the Choctaws and Chicka- saws without first securing to the Government a por- tion of their country for the settlement of other Indian

29 In all fairness it should be said that Dole claimed to have seen much to make removal of the Indians advisable on their own account. Proximity to the whites was proving, as always, exceedingly detrimental to their morals. For particulars, as pointed out by the Commissioner, see his Report, for 1863, p. 6, and for 1864, p. 5.

26 The Indian Under Reconstruction

tribes which we are compelled to remove from the States and Territory north of them." The confession was made to Phillips, a Kansas settler, a Kansas politi- cian, if you please, who, in his letter of March 22, had invited it.31 Upon Schofield's ideas 32 of identical

30 Dole to Phillips, April 6, 1864, O.I.A., Letter Book, no. 73, p. 434.

31 Phillips had written, "Of course the government understands its necessities and purposes here. The Indian nation being really the Key to the southwest makes me respectfully urge that guarantees be not given that we may have to break. Our necessities here are not of a character to force us to steps that may be prejudicial."

and again

"Having a clear view of what seems to me the government neces- sities I have been cautious about promising these rebels anything save what the mercy or generosity of the government might give them. I have thought that to sweep out the Choctaw country of rebels would leave very little, and that fragments, and that these countries south of the river might, if it was desired, be open for settlement. This would leave the Cherokee and Creek - weak as they are - almost in the shape of Reserves, and I have always felt that a proper policy could make a majority of these vote for a more secure organisation and com- munity. . ." (Extracts of letter from Phillips to Dole, March 22, 1864, op. cit.)

32 Schofield's letter has wider application than the present discussion calls for and is worth quoting almost entire. Its tone is sane throughout. -

"The hostile Indians in southwestern Arkansas and the Indian Country are manifesting a strong disposition to treat with the Govern- ment and General McNeil suggests that full powers should be given to some person to settle with them the terms of peace. There are some important facts connected with this matter which should not be lost sight of. The wealthy Indians, landholders mostly, nearly all joined the rebels, and are now among those suing for peace. The feeling of hostility on the part of the loyal Indians towards these rebels is intense. I believe the feud between them is of longer stand- ing than the present rebellion.

"It will, I believe, be practically impossible for the disloyal Indians to return and occupy their lands. They would all be murdered by the loyal, or "poor," Indians. It is an important question whether the lands owned by the disloyal Indians should not be all declared for- feited to the Government. Also, if forfeited, whether they should be given to the loyal Indians or be held by the Government with a view to the ultimate extinction of the Indian title to a portion of territory which must before many years be required for the use of white men.

"I presume the question of forfeiture is the only one which need be decided soon. My present information leads me to believe the lands

Overtures of Peace and Reconciliation 27

tenor and better-reasoned basis, made some months earlier and referred to him,33 Dole had not seen fit to so much as lightly comment and he had repeatedly dis- couraged congressional action looking to the same end. The mistrust of the Choctaws manifested by Colonel Phillips was fully warranted. The papers, inclusive of President Lincoln's amnesty proclamation, which he had caused to be distributed among the southern tribes, had had their effect and were the direct occasion for the calling of a general council to meet at Tishomingo, March 16 and therefore almost simultaneously with the convention at New Hope. "Seven delegates," reported Superintendent Coffin, "from each of the following rebel tribes," Choctaw, Creek, Seminole, Cherokee, Caddo, and Osage, were summoned.34 Presumably all attended.35 Full and fierce discussion of all points in- volved was inevitable for the times were critical. Some of the delegates argued for immediate submission, some for continued loyalty to the South. Finally, the in- owned by the hostile Indians should be declared forfeited and that they should not be permitted to return among the loyal. Their future peace seems to require that they be kept separate. This will of course embarrass very much any negotiations for peace. Yet I see no way of securing peace among the Indians on any other terms.

"My personal knowledge of these matters is too limited to justify the expression of a very decided opinion as to what policy should be adopted. I desire simply to call your attention to what seem to be important questions to be decided and to ask for instructions.

"I believe there is no civil officer of the Government now in that Territory, empowered to treat with the Indians." (Schofield to Hal- leek, November 12, 1863, op. cit.)

33 Halleck to War Department, November 18, 1863, ibid; Usher to Stan- ton, February 19, 1864, op. cit.

34 Coffin to Dole, March 16, 1864, O.I.A., General Files, Southern Su- perintendency, 1863-1864, C 824; Cox to Coffin, March 16, 1864, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1864, pp. 331-332.

35 Phillips, in reporting the meeting, omitted mention of the Cherokees (Phillips to Curtis, March 17, 1864, O.I. A., Land Files, Southern Su- perintendency, 1855-1870, W 412; Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1864, p. 329).

28 The Indian Under Reconstruction

fluence of Generals Maxey and Cooper, exerted from the outside, prevailed for the Confederacy and the ultimate resolution was, to make one more stand on Red River. Beyond that the council refused positively to commit its constituents ; for the sight of the distress- ful body of refugees stretching all across the country was enough to shake the fortitude of the strongest. Near the eastern boundary line, under the shelter of the garrison at Fort Smith, were those Choctaws, most- ly refugees,36 who had gathered at the New Hope con- vention, now dissolved; but other refugees, fearfully impoverished, were "clustered in great numbers from Washita River up Red River and on Washita below Fort Washita." Even the Indians of the least depleted resources and of the most pronounced secessionist per- suasion were discouraged. Many were running their slaves, their only remaining tangible wealth, to the Brazos for safety.

The summer of '64 brought no return of good for- tune to the Trans-Mississippi Department. Much had

36 A letter written to the Indian Office, February 22, 1865, by a man who signed himself Wm. T. (F. ?) Stephens and who was present at the con- vention, throws light upon its personnel, also incidentally upon the tribal status of Delegate Perkins and his notion of discharging his duties. It reads as follows:

"A part of our people are in a state of rebellion against the U. S. but the other part are loyal and are refugees at this post, and are in a destitute condition having left their homes and property in con- sequence of their political sentiments. The Choctaws that are at this place held a convention (or rather a Mass meeting) at New Hope, Choctaw Nation, on the i4th day of March 1864, and appointed E. P. Perkins to act as a delegate and represent their interest at Washington City, D.C. Said delegate is a white man who recently married a member of the Choctaw tribe of Indians; he is also an officer of the U.S. army. Said delegate proceeded to Washington City as I sup- pose but on his return did not give any satisfaction concerning the business upon which he was sent. Please inform me whether E. P. Perkins was recognized by the department . . ." (O.I.A., Gen- eral Files, Choctaw 1859-1866}.

Overtures of Peace and Reconciliation 29

been hoped for but little realized and, as a consequence, the distress and dissatisfaction of the Indians had grown apace. Apparently, they had given up all thought of making their peace with the North. In an excess of recovered zeal for a doomed cause, they had allowed the moment for a possible reconciliation to pass and the Federals had made no new overtures. The Indian alliance was now a desperate case, yet there was no talk of abandoning it. Desperate remedies had to be applied and foremost among them was a reversion to savagery. Irregular warfare of the most deplorable and destructive kind was now the ordinary thing, particularly where the Cherokee champion, Stand Watie, led. For such as he, there could be no sur- render. For him, utter despair was out of the question. Ready he was to risk everything, at any moment, in one last throw.

Another possible remedy, involving, perhaps, the essentials of the first, was an alliance with tribes that in happier days the highly-civilized southern would have scorned. This was something more than the In- dian confederacy that the Choctaws had earlier pro- jected. To consider its possibilities a general council was arranged for and invitations extended to all of their own group, to the indigenous and emigrant tribes of Kansas,37 and to the wild tribes of the plains. At the

37 Agent H. W. Martin reported upon this to Dole, September n, 1864, as follows:

"Through Keokuk, Che-kus-kuk, and Pah-teck-quaw, chiefs of the Sacs and Foxes of Mississippi and the most reliable men connected with the tribe, I learn that messengers from the Rebel Indians have been sent to many of the Indian tribes in Kansas, inviting them to meet in a grand council to be held in the Creek Country in or near the rebel lines the last of October next. These messengers are sent from the Comanches, Creeks, and other rebel tribes in the southwest. I am informed that the "Tobacco," as they term it, has been sent to the Big Hill Osages, Little Osages, Black Dog's Band of Osages,

30 The Indian Under Reconstruction

moment not much success attended the movement, ow- ing to the promptness with which Superintendent Cof- fin and others organized a counter one. They assem- bled representatives of all the tribes 38 they could reach

Sacs and Foxes, and, I have no doubt, to the Pottawatomies, Kaws, Kickapoos and all other tribes that they can reach.

"They proclaim that they will kill, clean out, all the whites to the Missouri River and occupy the country themselves. Now while I believe that the Sacs and Foxes, as a tribe, are as loyal to the Govern- ment of the United States as any other Indian tribe in Kansas, yet I have good reason to doubt the loyalty of two or three former leaders of what we call the Wild, or Prairie Band. For the good of the country and the Sac and Fox tribe, I would respectfully sug- gest the propriety of arresting and confining at Fort Leavenworth the parties referred to until the close of the war.

"The evidence that led me to this conclusion, I received from the above named chiefs, whom I have had watching this matter for the last six weeks. I can not give you the details so as to make it satis- factory. If I could see you, I think I could satisfy you that a grand effort is being made to involve all the Kansas Indians in this outbreak. "If the proposition to confine two or three of the doubtful Indians referred to meets your approbation, telegraph me Leavenworth, care of Carney & Stevens. . . " (O.I.A., General Files, Sac and Fox 2862-1866, M 371).

38 Among the Indians present at the Council were, Chickasaws, Creeks, Seminoles, Senecas, Quapaws, Shawnees, Osages, Western Miamies, Pot- tawatomies, Weas, Peorias, Kaskaskias, Piankeshaws, and Sacs and Foxes of Mississippi. The Kaws were not able to appear ; but their trustworthiness was not to be doubted. Their chiefs empowered Agent Farnsworth to attach their names to the declaration of loyalty (Farnsworth to Dole, Jan- uary 9, 1865, O.I.A., Land Files, Kansas 1863-1865, Box 80, F 204). Some slight aspersions had, indeed, been cast upon the Kaws; but their agent thought he could easily establish their innocence. His report sounds plausible,

"As soon as the annual payment was made, I obtained protection papers from the general commanding this District and all this tribe, with very few exceptions, left for the buffalo country. Last month I heard from different sources that the Kaws were not behaving well and were having friendly intercourse with tribes hostile to the U. States. In December I made a visit to all their camps on the Smoky Hill river, Sharps Creek, Little Arkansas, and Big Turkey. The Kaws have lost a few men and some stock, taken from them by hostile tribes, but I could not get the slightest evidence of any friendly feeling existing between these tribes. On the contrary, when I was among them, a large war party was absent after the Cheyennes to avenge their losses. The conduct of the Kaws towards the Whites has in-

Overtures of Peace and Reconciliation 31

in a "Grand Council" 39 at the Sac and Fox Agency between the fifth and ninth of October and secured from them an expression of unswerving loyalty to the government of the United States.40 Meanwhile the southern tribes, desperately in earnest, so continued and redoubled their own efforts that constant vigilance was necessary in order to circumvent them.

Towards the close of the year, the best plan of all for defeating the purpose of the secessionists was devised by the Cherokees. Had it been put into opera- tion, it might, not only have counteracted what Coffin called "the infamous machinations of the rebel hordes in the southwest," 41 but likewise have prevented the depredations on the Colorado line that, unchecked, grew to such astounding proportions in the decade after the war had closed. It might, moreover, have recalled, though tardily, the secessionists to their allegiance and ended the tribal estrangements that were to result so disastrously in the adjustments at the peace council. The plan was outlined in a memorandum, addressed to President Lincoln by Lewis Downing, Acting Princi- pal Chief of the Cherokees. It bore date, December 20, i864-42 It is here given : -

variably been friendly, and upon examination, all unfavorable reports were found to be without good foundation . . ." (Farnsworth to Dole, January 9, 1865, O.I.A., General Files, Kansas 1863-1868, F 202).

39 Of the council, Agent Martin had much that was interesting to say. See particularly Martin to Dole, October 10, 1864, O.I.A., Land Files, Indian Talks, Council, etc., Box 3, 1856-1864, M388: Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1864, p. 362.

40 The formal declaration of loyalty accompanied Agent Martin's letter and is on file with it. Its receipt was duly acknowledged by Dole in terms that revealed how much importance he, like others, was disposed to attach to the action of the council (Dole to Martin, November 7, 1864, O.I. A., Letter Book, no. 75, p. 397; Dole to Coffin, same date, ibid, p. 396).

41 Coffin to Mix, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, February i, 1865, O.I.A., General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1865, C 1209.

42 — Ibid.', Interior Department Files.

32 The Indian Under Reconstruction

We, the undersigned for ourselves and as the representatives of the Cherokee People, feeling an intense interest in maintain- ing perpetual harmony and good will among the various tribes of Indians mutually, as well as between these and the people and government of the United States, beg leave, very respectfully, to lay before your Excellency a few facts and suggestions relat- ing to this important subject.

We deem it a matter of vast moment to the Cherokees, Creeks and Seminoles, and to the State of Kansas and to Nebraska, as well as to the Whole Union, that the perfect friendship of the wild tribes be secured and maintained, while our friendship is of paramount importance to the said tribes; and it is with the deepest regret that we hear of and observe acts of hostility on the part of any Indians. It is our firm con- viction that southern rebels are, and have been, instigating the wild tribes to take part in the present rebellion against the Federal Government. The depredations recently committed by portions of some of these tribes on emigrants crossing the west- ern plains, we are forced to regard as the result of such instiga- tions on the part of the rebels.

There are also indications that these tribes are forming into predatory bands and are engaged in stealing stock in connection with wicked white men who are first loyal and then rebel as best suits their purposes of stealing and robbery.

As the war progresses and the rebel armies are broken into fragments, the rebels will doubtless scatter among these tribes and will make every effort to organize them into banditti — . Then, when the strength of the rebellion is broken and peace is formally declared and we are off our guard, they will fall upon defenseless neighborhoods of loyal Indians, or whites, and plunder and kill unrestrained.

The highways to the Pacific States and to the gold regions of the West, they will infest, to harass emigrants and merchants and endanger their property and lives. To keep down such depredations by force of arms will require many men and a vast expense.

In our opinion no pains should be spared to gain the friend- ship of these people by peaceful means and thus secure their help against the rebels and in favor of the public peace.

Overtures of Peace and Reconciliation 33

In the year 18 — , a general convention of Indian Tribes was held at Tahlequah in the Cherokee Nation which convened at the call of the Cherokee National Council. Representatives from the Cherokees, Creeks, Seminoles, Chickasaws, Delawares, Shawnees, Osages, Senecas, and twelve other nations attended this convention and participated in its deliberations. It was a harmonious, pleasant and profitable meeting of Red men of the West. Friendship and good will were established and a league was entered into by which the most friendly relations were maintained among the various tribes for many years. Arrange- ments were made for the punishment of crimes committed by the citizens of any nation on those of any other.

Many years have passed away since the said convention of tribes. Men who were then young now occupy prominent posi- tions and are the rulers of their respective nations, yet they know but little of the harmonious feeling and the amity estab- lished among their fathers.

The long continuation of the present war, together with the lies and machinations of the rebels, operating on these ignorant tribes, have shaken the confidence of some of them in the gov- ernment of the United States and, to some extent, made the impression that the Cherokees, Creeks, and other nations who are in alliance with the Federal Government, are the enemies of these wild tribes and that the enemies of the Government are their friends.

In view of this state of things we propose that the nations, who are righting under the banner of the Union, invite all the tribes of the Southwest and as many others as possible to meet in general convention and re-establish their league of amity and re-assert, in solemn council, their loyalty to the Federal Gov- ernment. Let them there, in the presence of the Great Spirit, give mutual pledges to maintain the peace among themselves and with their white brethren, to abstain from all acts of theft, robbery, murder or violence, and to do all in their power to bring to justice any persons, either Indians or whites, who may be guilty of such acts, or may incite others to commit them un- der any pretex whatever.

Let them there league together to crush out the rebellion and put an end to the war throughout the country.

34 The Indian Under Reconstruction

We propose that the said convention of tribes be held near Claremore's Mound, on the Verdigris River, in the Cherokee Nation and that it convene in the early part of next June.

We all desire very respectfully to request President Lincoln to send a talk signed with his own hand and sealed with the great seal of the United States to this convention. Let him also send a white pipe, and with tobacco and a white flag and the Book of God containing the talk of the Great Spirit to men. Let all be wrapped in the flag of Union and let him send some suitable person to deliver this talk, and on behalf of the Pres- ident to smoke the pipe of peace with these nations of Indians beneath the waves of these flags.

We would also ask that the President give to military com- manders orders to afford proper protection to such convention and to the delegates both in going to and returning from said convention.

In view of the fact that the war has so desolated our country that the Cherokees cannot, as in former times, provide for the feeding of such a council, we, very relucktantly, ask that such provision be made by the United States.

II. THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES

The existence of Indian refugees was the best indica- tion that all projects, made while the Civil War was still in progress, for the removal southward of Kansas tribes and for the organization of Indian Territory were decidedly premature and altogether out of place. For a season, indeed, they were almost presumptuous. Disaster followed disaster and it seemed wellnigh im- possible for the Federals ever to regain what they had so lightly thrown aside in 1861. At the very moment when the removal policy was being re-enacted there were upwards of fifteen thousand Indians living as exiles and outcasts solely because the United States government was not able to give them protection in their own homes. Nevertheless, with strange incon- sistency and the total ignoring of most patent facts, its law-makers discussed in all seriousness, as is the habit of politicians, the re-populating with new northern tribes the very country that the army had abandoned and had not yet recovered. Meanwhile, as if to add to the incongruity of the whole matter, three full regi- ments of Indian Home Guards, composed largely of the legitimate owners of the territory in question, were fighting on the Union side.

The earlier misfortunes of the Indian refugees have been described with fullness of detail in the preceding volume of this work. A large proportion of the first Indians, who had fled for safety across the border, had been conducted, at vast expense, with much murmur-

36 The Indian Under Reconstruction

ing, and some show of resistance, to the Sac and Fox Agency. There they were yet, the old men, women, and children, that is; for the braves were away fight- ing. They included Creeks 43 who had accompanied Opoethleyohola in his flight, a few Euchees, Kickapoos, and Choctaws, about two hundred and twenty-five Chickasaws,44 and about three hundred Cherokees.45 At Neosho Falls, were the refugee Seminoles, some seven hundred and sixty, not counting the enlisted war- riors.46 On the Ottawa Reservation, were the non- fighting Quapaws and the Senecas and Shawnees,47 while, encamped on the Verdigris and Fall rivers, in the neighborhood of Belmont, were almost two thou- sand Indian refugees from the Leased District.48 They had come there following the outbreak that had re- sulted in the brutal murder of Agent Leeper. Beyond them and beyond the reach of aid, as it proved, at the Big Bend of the Arkansas, were Comanches, one band, and scattering elements of other wild tribes.

At the opening of 1863, the great bulk of the Cher- okees were in southwestern Missouri, exposed to every conceivable kind of danger incident to a state of war. They were the larger part of those who, when the Con-

43 Perry Fuller asserted that the Creeks at the Sac and Fox Agency exceeded five thousand in number. It was doubtless an outside estimate, which had taken account of the braves, absent with the Home Guards, as well as of the more helpless members of the tribe. It was at this time that Fuller succeeded in having himself made attorney for the Creeks (Fuller to Dole, March 21, 1863, O.I.A., .General Files, Creek, 1860-1869) and likewise for the Chickasaws, Choctaws, Quapaws, and Leased District In- dians (Same to same, April 15, 1863, ibid., Southern Superintendency, 1863- 1864, F 35; Same to same, April 18, 1863, ibid., F 37).

44 Coleman to Coffin, September 2, 1863, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1863, p. 184.

45 Harlan to Coffin, September 2, 1863, ibid., p. 179.

46 Snow to Coffin, September 4, 1863, ibid., p. 185.

47 Coffin to Dole, September 24, 1863, ibid., p. 174.

48 — Ibid., p. 177.

Return of the Refugees 37

federates successfully invaded and occupied the Na- tion, had escaped to the Neutral Lands, a portion of their own tribal domain but within the limits of Kan- sas, and had been discovered, in October of 1862, set- tled upon Drywood Creek, about twelve miles south of Fort Scott. The Indian Office field employees had ministered to their needs promptly,49 if not efficiently; but, towards the close of the year, to the great sur- prise 50 and financial embarrassment of Superintendent Coffin and under pretext of restoring them immediately to their homes,51 the army, ordered thereto by General Blunt, had removed them, bag and baggage, to Ne- osho.52 There they had remained, their position in-

49 Coffin to Dole, September 24, 1863, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1863, p. 175; Coffin to B. T. Henning, December 28, 1863, ibid., pp. 192-193.

60 Coffin to Mix, August 31, 1863, O.I.A., General Files, Southern Su- perintendency, 1863-1864, C 466.

51 Blunt entertained grave suspicions of the probity of Coffin and his subordinates and he feared that unless something were soon done to remove the refugees beyond the reach of their graft the service would be eternally disgraced. Moreover, it was high time some attempt were being made to keep the promises to the Indian Home Guard. A letter of Blunt's, written after his first indignation had exhausted itself, and he had been reconciled to Coffin may here be quoted in part.

". . . it was a military necessity that something should be done immediately to save the Indian regiments from demoralization and quiet the apprehensions of the other refugees. I had to act and act promptly. Certain parties who were interested in keeping the Indians in Kansas complained that I was interfering with that which was not pertinent to me and no doubt made representations to Col. Coffin relative to my acts that were false and which led to the writing of the letter by Coffin to me -which I thought was impertinent and uncalled for -Language that I made use of in that report -and which I learn has been construed into specific charges against Col. Coffin -was not so intended but was intended to apply more particularly to the cormorants & peculators who hang around every Dept. of the Govern- ment. . . " (Blunt to Secretary of the Interior, January 25, 1863, I. D. Files, Bundle, no. 51 (1863) ; O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, B 61).

52 The southern superintendency continued to supply them with neces- saries as best it could (Coffin to Harlan, December 29, 1862, Commissioner

38 The Indian Under Reconstruction

creasingly precarious and their condition, because of the desolateness of the region and its inaccessibility to adequate supplies, increasingly miserable, until March, i863.53

By that time, General Blunt had made his peace with Superintendent Coffin 54 although he had failed to keep his promises to the Indians, who, as a result of un- realized hopes, were becoming daily more fractious, both the refugees and their kin in the Indian Brigade. Colonel Phillips of the Third Indian Regiment, which was wholly Cherokee, sympathised with them ; for only too well he knew the lack of consideration shown the loyal Indian and the secondary place he was forced to occupy in the public estimation. Despised, disap- pointed, discouraged, the Indian Home Guards were getting mutinous. Moreover, southwestern Missouri, if not "a perfect den of rebels," as Coffin, in his chagrin and indignation had described it, was no fit place for helpless women and children.

With the first indication of the breaking up of win- ter, Colonel Phillips recommended, in strong terms, the resumption of the task of refugee restoration 55 and solicited, for it, the assistance of the southern su- perintendent, heretofore ignored. Coffin responded with secret elation; for, by appealing to him, the mil- itary authorities had tacitly acknowledged the inepti- tude of which he constantly accused them. Agents

of Indian Affairs, Report, 1863, PP> I93'I945 Harlan to Coffin, September 2, 1863, ibid., p. 179). Its efforts to relieve their distress were supplemented by those of the military.

53 Coffin to Dole, January 5, 1863, ibid., p. 192.

54 Blunt to Secretary of the Interior, January 25, 1863, I. D. Files, Bun- dle, no. 51 (1863) ; Register of Letters Received, Jan. 2, 1862 to Dec. 27, 1865, "Indians," no. 4, p. 175.

55 In the opinion of Phillips, it was imperative that the removal should take place in March " and not impracticable" (Phillips to Proctor, February 17, 1863, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1863, pp. 196-197).

Return of the Refugees 39

Justin Harlan and A. G. Proctor were detailed to con- duct the expedition and early in April the majority of the Cherokee refugees were again in their own country. Before departing from Neosho, Harlan had come to an understanding with Phillips by which the two had agreed that the reconstruction work should begin on the Tahlequah side of the Arkansas, where beeves and milch cows were yet to be had. Seeds had been pro- vided by the Department of Agriculture 56 and garden- ing implements by that of the Interior, so all was in readiness; but Phillips with the vacillation, which seems to have been his crowning fault, changed the plan at the last moment and without seeking further advice from his fellow in authority. He crossed the line at about the same time Harlan's company did and at once issued an order for the establishment of six different posts, or points of distribution.57 As a result, the refugees scattered in all directions. The problem of protecting them became a serious one. The Con- federates were still lingering in the country. No at- tempt had been made to oust them before undertaking the return of the refugees. No expected accretion came to swell Phillips's command. Indeed, before very long he was in danger of having to fall back into Kansas ; for Blunt's troops were nearly all being drawn off "for the purpose of re-enforcing General Herron in Missouri." 58 The Indian Brigade, Phillips in com- mand, intrenched itself at Fort Gibson 59 and there,

58 This is inferred from Dole's letter to Phillips, February 25, 1865 (O.I.A., Letter Book, no. 70, p. 97). Phillips had made an early applica- tion for the same (I. D., Register of Letters Received, "Indians," no. 4, p. 421, January 23, 1863).

57 Harlan to Coffin, May, 26, 1863, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1863, p. 204.

58 Coffin to Dole, May 2, 1863, ibid., p. 199.

59 A. G. Proctor to Coffin, July 31, 1863, O.I. A., General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1863-1864, C 466; Same to same, August 9, 1863, ibid.

40 The Indian Under Reconstruction

too, the now doubly disappointed refugees eventually huddled so as to profit by the protection of its garrison, their range limited, scarcely any farming possible. It was most vexatious, since, if the original plan had been carried out, a force of about two hundred men might have been ample to protect Tahlequah.60 Harlan was beside himself with indignation and especially so when its own meagre resources exhausted, the brigade had to borrow 61 from the produce intended for the sub- sistence of the refugees. The replenishment of sup- plies was something no one dared count upon with any certainty. There was nothing to be obtained south of Fort Scott; for the country intervening between that place and Fort Gibson was totally uncultivated. It had been devastated over and over again and was now practically denuded of everything upon which to sup- port life. Moreover, it was infested with bush- whackers, who roamed hither and thither, raiding when they could, terrorizing, murdering. And then, not one of them but like unto them, there was Stand Watie, Cherokee chief of the Ridge faction, staunch Confederate, who, insatiably bent upon vengeance, harrowed the country right and left or lay in wait, with his secessionist tribesmen, for any chance supply train that might be wending its way towards Gibson.62

As the summer advanced, the wants of the restored refugees grew apace and proportionately their despair. So pitiable was their state, mentally and physically, with no prospect of amelioration that the most hard-

60 Henry Smith to Coffin, July 16, 1863, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1863, p. 212.

61 Borrowing was not invariably the mode of procedure; for the military authorities, complained Coffin, sometimes forcibly seized the supplies meant for Indians. (Letter to Mix, August 31, 1863, ibid., pp. 216-218).

62 Coffin to Dole, September 24, 1863, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1863, pp. 175-176.

Return of the Refugees 41

hearted of the onlookers was moved to compassion. Rumors were afloat that they were to be sent back to Kansas,63 since military protection, poor as it was, might at any moment have to be withdrawn. Such a confession of failure was unavoidable under the cir- cumstances. The situation was most perplexing. As late as June, Blunt was not able to furnish large enough escorts for supply trains, so depleted was his army, and recruits had to be sought for from among the refugees at Belmont.64 The turn in the tide came, fortunately, soon afterwards and Phillips received his long-looked- for re-enforcements. Local conditions were not much improved, however, and stories about the necessity of forcing another exodus still continued to circulate. They had their foundation in fact and Coffin was in agreement with Phillips that return across the border might be advisable for the winter months.65 In south- ern Kansas, provisions were plentiful and cheap, while supply trains were a costly experiment and a provoca- tion to the enemy.66

63 — Ibid., pp. 203, 211, 213.

64 Coffin to Dole, July ti, 1863, ibid., p. 210.

65 Report, Coffin to Dole, September 24, 1863, ibid., p. 176.

66 Published with Dole's annual report for 1863, are various letters that show, in one way or another, how difficult it was to get the supply trains through. There were dangers besetting them from start to finish. When one train, for instance, was about to leave Emporia, in May, the country all around was excited over the presence of jayhawkers (Coffin to Dole, May 26, 1863, ibid., p. 201). The following gives some illustration of the variety of difficulties attending transit:

"Mr. Dole leaves today for Kansas and I improve the opportunity to communicate to you.

"I arrived safely at Fort Gibson on Friday the 24th and crossed the train on the ferry next day. I received no reinforcements from Gibson . . . All but eight or ten of our Indians had left us as soon as there was danger of our being molested.

"We were ordered by messenger from Gen1 Blunt to cross at Ross' ford and move on to Tahlequah, as the families were to be moved there. Grand River was however impassable so I moved the train

42 The Indian Under Reconstruction

Superintendent Coffin expressed exasperation at the whole proceeding. "The contrariness and interference manifested by the military authorities" 67 had annoyed him exceedingly and he rated restoration under their auspices as at the maximum in impudence and at the minimum in accomplishment. If they would but do their rightful part, clear the country of Confederates and render it safe for occupancy by the defenceless wards of the nation, the remaining refugees, those liv- ing miscellaneously in Kansas, might be returned.

With effective military protection as a prerequisite, he accordingly recommended their return. That was in September, when he made his annual report.68 His prerequisite was a large order; for it was most unlikely that the War Department would arrange its affairs with reference to Indian comfort and safety as matters for primary concern. It had never thus far been overzeal- ous to co-operate with the Indian Office. As compared with the great needs of the nation, in times so critical, the welfare of aborigines was a mere bagatelle. It might be thrown to the winds ; they, in fact, annihilated and no thought taken.

The reasons for expediting refugee restoration were many and more than balanced, in importance at all events, the elements of previous failure. They were chiefly of two kinds, financial and personal. The cost of maintenance had been a heavy charge upon tribal funds, both regular and diverted. The expenditure of relief money had given satisfaction to nobody unless,

down to Gibson and crossed there to save time. Moved from Ft. Gibson Sunday & train started for Kans. Tues. accompanied by Judge Harlan." (Proctor to Dole, July 31, 1863, Southern Superintendency, C 466 of 1863).

67 Coffin to Mix, August 31, 1863, O.I.A., General Files, Southern Su- perintendency, 1863-1864, C 466.

68 Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1863, p. 178.

Return of the Refugees 43

possibly, to contractors. The estimates had mounted every quarter. To Coffin, Dole had conceded a large discretion. He probably knew his man and his own conduct may not have been impeccable.69 At any rate, from the official point of view, Coffin greatly abused the trust reposed in him and, even if not guilty of pos- itive dishonesty as charged by his enemies,70 was not always wise in his decisions. To Dole's disgust, he spent refugee relief money for resident Kansas tribes, temporarily embarrassed, although they had large tri- bal funds of their own and, in individual cases, were really well to do.71 At the same time, he grumbled because he was forced to stint the true refugees, his allowance not being nearly enough, and he begrudged any portion of it to the Cherokees in Indian Territory,72 who, though ostensibly restored, were in a most dis- tressful state, wretchedly poor.

69 Dole's participation in the bidding for the sale of the Sac and Fox trust lands, while not exactly criminal, transgressed the ethics of the public position which he filled (Abel, Indian Reservations in Kansas and the Extinguishment of Their Titles, Kansas Historical Society Collections, vol. viii, p. 101).

70 Blunt's suspicions returned in force. How strong they were may be inferred from his request, August i, 1863, that "if a special agent be sent to investigate Indian affairs in Kansas," "an honest man be selected who is not engaged in Indian contracts." (I. D., Register of Letters Received, "Indians," no. 4, p. 178). Acting Secretary Otto instructed Dole, September 2, 1863, to have the "matters referred to by General Blunt" investigated (ibid., Letter Press Book, "Indian Affairs," no. 5, p. 140). See also J. W. Wright to Usher, September 6, 1863, ibid, Files.

71 Dole to Coffin, June 18, 1863, O.I. A., Letter Book, no. 71, pp. 50-51; Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1863, p. 206. The Neosho Files of the Indian Office reveal a state of destitution among the New York Indians in 1862 and 1863. They were Kansas immigrants. Coffin distrib- uted relief to them, nevertheless. The Wyandotts, whom he likewise as- sisted, were immigrants and, in normal times, wealthy.

72 The suggestion that the Cherokees be disconnected, in a fiscal way, from the other refugees and subsisted "from the appropriation accruing to them from their trust fund interest" came originally from Dole, it would seem (Coffin to Dole, June 8, 1863, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1863, p. 205).

44 The Indian Under Reconstruction

The Indians in all localities were dissatisfied. They were tired of privation, tired of changed habits of life, and they were homesick. "The strange attachment of these Indians," wrote P.P. Elder, "to their country and homes from which they were driven, and their great desire to return thither, continue unabated." 73 Elder wrote thus of the insignificant Neosho Agency tribes; but what he said might have applied to any. The Seminoles, who at Neosho Falls were more comfort- able than most of the refugees, suffering less,74 put up a pitiful plea. Their old chief, Billy Bowlegs, well- known to the government because of his exploits in Florida, was away with the army at Camp Bentonville ; but he wrote sadly of his own hope of return to the country that he had not set foot in since the war began.75 That country was endeared to him, not because it held the bones of his ancestors but simply because it was home. Home recovered would mean re-union with his family. He envied the Cherokee soldiers, who were now in close touch with their women and children. He admitted there was great confusion in the Indian Territory; but he had noticed empty houses there, deserted, in which he was childishly confident his peo- ple might find shelter.76 His communications fired the

73 Elder to Coffin, September 20, 1863, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1863, p. 187.

74 Snow to Coffin, September 4, 1863, ibid., p. 185.

75 Billy Bowlegs to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, March 2, 1863, O.I.A., General Files, Seminole, 1858-1869, B 131. A copy of this letter was for- warded to Coffin, March 24, 1863 (ibid., Letter Book, no. 70, p. 208). On the thirteenth of May, Bowlegs wrote to Dole again (ibid., General Files, Seminole, B 317 of 1863), expressive of his confidence that the United States power could, if it would, clear the Indian country of Confederates. The Seminole part of it was being held by disloyal Seminoles and Texans. Bow- legs signed himself, "King of the Seminoles and Captain of Co. 'F', ist. Ind. H. G.," and he asked for the replacement of a gun which he had lost in a tussel with a bushwhacker, who had run away with his horse.

76 Billy Bowlegs, Fos-huchee-ha-jo, No-ko-so-lo-chee, Koch-e-me-ko to

Return of the Refugees 45

enthusiasm of those same people and they begged their Great Father to send them back. They would go, no matter what impediments athwart their way and they would go that very fall.77 Agent Snow doubted their being able to maintain themselves in their devastated country during the winter;78 but the thought did not deter them. They had known a scarcity of food in Kansas the preceding year and might fare better far- ther south. Anyhow, they could burn green wood as they pleased, which they had not been allowed to do on the white man's land. They had taken everything into consideration and where the Great Father's energy ended theirs would begin.

The homesickness of the refugees was due to a vari- ety of causes and not of least consequence was the en-

Oak-to-ha and Pas-co-fa, dated Ft. Blunt, C.N., September 4, 1863, O.I.A., General Files, Southern Superiniendency, 1863-1864.

77 "We have got a letter from Billy Bowlegs and others . . . and from what we hear in this letter we think we can go home with safety. We know it will be impossible for the Government to haul provisions all the way down there for us. We have taken all this into considera- tion. We know that we will live hard this winter, but we want to go home on our own land. We must be there this fall if we expect to plant in the spring. Corn must be put in there in March. Fences must be built, houses repaired, farms improved and this must all be done before we can expect to raise a crop . . .

"We are here on the white man's land - we cannot cut green wood to burn and when we got word from Billy Bowlegs that we can get in our own country, we are anxious to go where we can burn green wood as we please. And we would ask you to help us to move down before cold weather sets in. Our dear Father, if you can only get wagons, we want you to get all you can to help us back to our homes . . . And if you can't help us then we will try what we can do in moving ourselves. We expect that the rebels have destroyed all of our property, but we think if we can get to our Brothers the Cherokees we could get enough of them to live on, untill we could raise something for ourselves ..." (Pas-ko-fa, Seminole, Tus- ta-nuk-e-mantha, Creek, Robert Smith, Cherokee, Lewis, Chickasaw, to Wm. P. Dole, dated Neosho Falls, Kansas, September 14, 1863, ibid.).

78 Snow to Dole, September 14, 1863, ibid.

46 The Indian Under Reconstruction

forced change in their habits of living. Let it be remembered that they had come from homes of com- fort and plenty. In Indian Territory, they had lived in up-to-date houses and had fed upon fruit and vegeta- bles and abundantly upon meat. In Kansas, cast-off army tents were their portion and frequently damaged grain their diet. The tents had not been enough to protect them from the inclemency of the weather, their clothes were threadbare,79 their bodies under-nourished. The mortality among them had been appalling and only very recently on the decline. Moreover, they were apprehensive of what was being charged against their account; for they, from long experience, had no illusions as to the white man's generosity. The whis- perings of graft and peculation were not unheeded by them and their mutterings echoed political recrimina- tions. They were conscious that they had outstayed their welcome in Kansas, that citizens, who were not profiting from the expenditure of the relief money, were clamoring for them to be gone. On the Ottawa Reservation, and to some extent on the Sac and Fox, their red hosts had ceased to be sympathetic.

Practically, all of the agents in the southern su- perintendency with the exception of Harlan 80 advised the return of the refugees to Indian Territory and they advised that it be undertaken early. Coleman appar- ently seconded the urgent appeal of his charges that they be sent home "the earliest practicable moment."

79 The clothing distributed among the refugees at the Sac and Fox Agency allowed a part of a suit only to each individual (Cutler to Coffin, September 5, 1863, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1863, p. 181). It must have been of extraordinarily poor quality; for, within ten months, it was almost worn out.

80 The plight of those already removed constituted a warning against being over-sanguine and Harlan refrained from endorsing the advice given by his fellow-agents (Harlan to Coffin, December 7, 1863).

Return of the Refugees 47

A return in the autumn or the winter would permit them to "gather cattle and hogs sufficient to furnish meat, and at the same time prepare their fields for a spring crop, thereby obviating the obligation of the government to subsist and clothe them." 81 The Creeks were, however, afraid to venture before assurance was forthcoming that their enemies had certainly been cleaned out. Were that assurance to come, it would bring conviction of another thing, that secessionist In- dians, now despondent, had returned to their allegiance to the United States government. There were many indications that they were wavering in their adherence to the Confederacy.82 For their return, as for refugee restoration, military protection would have to be a pre- liminary provision and it would have to extend beyond the confines of Fort Gibson and southward as well as northward of the Arkansas River. That river ought to be opened to navigation. Were transit once ren- dered safe, the Indians would haul their own supplies; but they wanted more than the Cherokee country cleared and protected.83 The Chickasaws, for instance, could not go back until such time as Forts Washita and Arbuckle had been seized and garrisoned. A small incompetent force in Indian Territory was worse than none at all. It simply invited attack and, if not aug- mented, should be withdrawn.8*

The wheels of governmental action turn slowly and

81 Coleman to Coffin, September 2, 1863, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1863, p. 184.

82 A "strong Union element" was reported existing among the Chickasaws and Choctaws. Union leagues were forming and the secessionists waiting for a Federal force to appear before breaking away from their alliance with the South (Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1863, p. 26). Secession- ist Creeks were resorting to Fort Gibson and enlisting with the Home Guards (ibid., p. 182).

*3 — Ibid., p. 184.

84 Harlan to Coffin, September 2, 1863, ibid., p. 180.

The Indian Under Reconstruction

the winter months of 1863 came and went with no for- ward movement for refugee restoration. In January of the next year, the agitation for it reached Congress and, on the twenty-seventh, the Senate Indian com- mittee, through its chairman, called upon Usher for his opinion as to whether "the state of affairs" would not allow a return to Indian Territory in time for the raising of a crop.85 On the fifth of February, Dole consulted with General Blunt,86 who was then in Wash- ington and who might be presumed to possess some expert knowledge of the subject. Blunt replied 8T to the effect that the refugees ought most assuredly to be reinstated in their own country to prevent demoraliza- tion among them ; but that the serious obstacle to the carrying out of so desirable a policy was the lack of military protection. "Since the creation of the Depart- ment of Kansas all the troops heretofore serving in the District of the Frontier, except three Regiments of Indian Home Guards at Fort Gibson (very much decimated) are reporting to General Steele in the Department of Missouri." The Indian country was somewhat removed from all convenient sources of sup-

88 Doolittle to Usher, January 27, 1864, I. D., Files, Bundle, no. 52 (1864).

86 "Knowing that you have lately been in command of our forces in the vicinity of Forts Smith and Gibson and are familiar with the condition of the Indian Country south of Kansas, I respectfully re- quest you to furnish me with a statement of your views as to the propriety of an immediate return of the Refugee Indians now in Kansas to their homes, and, especially as to whether the military forces now in the Indian Country and vicinity are adequate to afford such protection to these Indian Refugees as would enable them to remain at, and cultivate their farms in that Country, without constant danger of being driven therefrom, their growing crops destroyed, and they compelled to seek the protection of the Forts, and further as to the practicability and means of subsisting them in that country while raising a crop." (Dole to Blunt, February 5, 1864).

87 Blunt to Dole, February 5, 1864, O.I.A., General Files, Southern Su- perintendency, 1863-1864, B 656; Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1864, pp. 322-323.

Return of the Refugees 49

ply, the Arkansas was closed to navigation, and stores had to be transported long distances over interior lines. It "required a large portion of the small military force there to protect the trains." The difficulties in the way of obtaining supplies were the main reasons why the Federals were occupying so small a section of the Indian country. Blunt's recommendation was, a re- organization of the western departments so as to give to General Curtis, in command of the Department of Kansas, the control of the "two western tiers of the counties of Arkansas" and most certainly of Fort Smith, the supply depot of Indian Territory.88 Suffi- cient troops must be furnished to permit of "successful operations both defensive and offensive."

Possessed of this additional information, the Senate carried its inquiries to the War Department and ascer- tained from its secretary that no reason was known there why the refugees should not return. Accord- ingly, on the third of March, James H. Lane intro- duced a joint resolution calling for their removal from Kansas.89 He gave their number as ninety-two hun- dred and the monthly cost of their maintenance as sixty thousand dollars. The resolution was referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs. On the twenty-second, he sent to Dole a paper,90 signed by members of the Indian committee of each house, earnestly recommend-

88 Blunt pointed out that Fort Smith, captured by the Federals, Septem- ber ist, 1863, had been peculiarly placed by the departmental reorganization. In the Department of Kansas, was "the military post . . . through which (the garrison) runs the line dividing the state from the Choctaw Nation, and separated from the city by a single street, the city being in the Department of Missouri." The arrangement was exceedingly dis- advantageous since Fort Smith was necessarily "the Depot and base of all military operations in the Indian country and also the Depot for supplying the Indians ..."

89 Cong. Globe, 38th cong., ist sess., p. 921.

90 General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1863-1864.

50 The Indian Under Reconstruction

ing an immediate return to Indian Territory so as to make the putting in of a crop that season possible.91 Congress appropriated the requisite funds.92

How Secretary Stanton, with all the facts before him, the facts alleged by General Blunt and true, could have conscientiously conveyed the impression that he did convey to the Senate Indian committee is a mystery. The restored Cherokees had not been sent back to Kan- sas as at one time proposed. Their own feelings would have been against such a move had it ever been serious- ly contemplated ; but for reasons, military and econom- ic, not to say political, they had been retained in Indian Territory. More and more their numbers were in one way added to and in another taken from. Malnutri- tion, overcrowding and bad hygienic conditions gen- erally offered fertile soil for diseases. Small-pox alone carried the refugees off by hundreds. Medical aid, reported by Agent Cox as "indispensably necessary," was not to be had and military protection was even less of a factor in the alleviation of misery than it had been. Guerrillas raided and robbed at will. It was

91 It was scarcely necessary to urge this upon Dole ; for earlier, on February 25th, he had himself informed Usher that immediate action must be taken if the refugees were to be removed to their homes the coming spring (O.I.A., Report Book, no. 13, pp. 316-317).

92 On March 25, 1864, Senator Doolittle introduced a bill (S 198) to aid the refugees in returning home. It was referred to his committee (Cong. Globe, 38th cong., ist sess., p. 1274). It passed the House of Representatives in due course (ibid., pp. 2016, 2050) and became law, May 3rd.

93 Cox to Coffin, December 5, 1863 (O.I.A., Cherokee, C 633). This letter is quoted in full in connection with the subject matter of Chapter vii. The census roll of the Cherokees which accompanied it has more than statistical value and is here given. Its file mark is, Cherokee, C 647. Coffin's letter of January 25th, 1864 -he wrote it from Fort Leavenworth - refers to Cox's census as but temporary and promises the transmission of Harlan's as soon as it is completed.

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52 The Indian Under Reconstruction

only directly under the guns of Fort Gibson that life and property were at all secure.9*

Late in the autumn, the Cherokee authorities, taking cognizance of all such facts and fearing lest longer delay might result in unmitigated woe to the nation, resolved to make one last desperate appeal 95 for effec- tive military aid. The National Council, therefore, authorized 96 the appointment of a deputation that should call upon General McNeil and acquaint him with all the circumstances of the case. The special

94 Letters from agents furnish abundant evidence of this. Two in particular from Justin Harlan, both of date, December yth, 1863, are worth noting. Coffin's letter of transmittal (O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, 1863-1864), dated from Washington, January 22, 1864, will be found to be an excellent introduction to Harlan's (ibid., Cherokee, €633) as well as a summary of other communications.

95 Another kind of appeal was made at intervals to the Indian Office. December 17, 1863, Dole reported to Usher news that he had received from the Cherokee delegation then in Washington, Downing, Jones, and McDaniel, all to the effect that there was absolute destitution in the Nation (O.I. A., Report Book, no. 13, p. 262).

96 "Be it enacted by the National Council, That the Principal Chief be and he is hereby authorized to appoint a deputation of three persons whose duty it shall be to visit the General commanding the 'District of the Frontier,' and lay before him a full statement of the present condition of the Cherokee people. It shall be their duty to set forth the services tendered by the Cherokees in the Army of the United States, the painful destruction of life they have sustained from the many casualties incident to war and the heavy loss of property they have been forced to bear from the waste and depredations com- mitted upon them by various persons under one pretext or another.

"And they are directed to assure the General ... of the un- shaken loyalty of the great mass of the Cherokee people . . . and of their unwavering fidelity to the stipulations of the treaties existing between said Government and the Cherokee Nation.

"The said deputation are further directed to request the General . . . to adopt such stringent measures as will abate the evils com- plained of and to make such disposition of the forces under his com- mand, & particularly of the Indian troops, as will enable them to hold the Indian Country, protect their homes & families and repel and punish Rebel forces making raids . . .

"And finally to ask authority to raise a Regiment of native troops to be officered by themselves and mounted, equipped and supported

Return of the Refugees 53

boon asked of him should be, either such a disposition of the Indian Brigade as would be a defence in actual- ity or permission to raise a real Home Guard. In course of time, news of the mission reached Washing- ton 97 and its object was brought through the instru- mentality of General Canby 98 to the attention of the

by the United States for duty more particularly in the Indian Country & whose terra of service shall be three years or during the war. Ketoowha, C.N., Nov. tyth, 1863

JAMES VANN, Prest. Pro tern, Nat1. Com*. (Signed)

J. B. JONES, Clk. Nat. Committee, Concurred

ALLEN Ross, Clk. Council TAH-LAH-LAH, Speaker of Council

Approved,

SMITH CHRISTIE, Acts Prin1 Chief."

97 The deputation submitted to Colonel Phillips "a statement of their views and wishes," which Representative A. C. Wilder referred to the Indian Office, February 10, 1864 (O.I.A., General Files, Cherokee, 1859- 1865, W 332). The Reverend Evan Jones endorsed the application (ibid., J 401). He was associated with Lewis Downing and James McDaniel as a special delegate from the Cherokees. Under authority from General Blunt, these three men, all of the Indian Guard contingent, Jones as chaplain, ist I.H.G., Downing as lieutenant-colonel, 3rd I.H.G., and McDaniel, captain, 2nd I.H.G., had come to Washington in the spring of 1863 to present the Cherokee cause to the authorities. The War Department resented their coming and Secretary Stanton ordered that their expenses should be charged against Blunt's command -

"... the nature of their business and the necessity for the absence of these officers from their commands is not known by this Department. The action of Major General Blunt in sending them was disapproved and his pay was ordered stopped, until it was ascertained that the Government was not involved in any expense by that action ..." (Letter to Usher, January 10, 1864). The foregoing was sent in reply to an inquiry from Senator Lane, whom Blunt had interested in his claim (A.G.O., Old Files Section, 61340 of 1863; 62133 (V.S.) 1863). Apparently, the matter did not end there and the regimental pay of the delegates was withheld. Blunt and Curtis both urged payment; but the case hung fire for some time (ibid., 61013 (V.S.) 1863, Jacket 3 of 15; C 13, 16, C 16, C 405, Wi39O, W 3239, A 478, J 575 (V.S.) 1864; 81040, Wi78 (V.S.) 1865, Jacket 4 of 15).

For Dole's hearty endorsement of the Cherokee petition, see his report to Usher, March 7, 1864, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1864, pp. 325-326.

98 General E. R. S. Canby transmitted, January 10, 1864, to the General- in-Chief of the Army a copy of the resolutions of the Cherokee National Council, his sympathies having been aroused by the very evident distress

54 The Indian Under Reconstruction

War Department. The official comment to the effect that the commander of the Department of Kansas would no doubt afford protection to the restored refu- gees was almost ironical in view of the fact that, by general orders of April seventeenth, Indian Territory was detached from that department and given to Gen- eral Steele, commanding the rival one of Arkansas ". Of so little account had been General Blunt's intima- tion that a part of Arkansas should be added to Curtis' command if anything really remedial were in contem- plation for the refugees, restored or to be restored.

The expeditious removal of a horde of human beings, more or less helpless by reason of sex, age or condition, was not the easy undertaking some people thought it. Anticipatory of congressional action, Superintendent Coffin prepared, in February, to transfer his office to Fort Smith by April first;100 but at that point his ac- tivity halted. Kansas food contractors were interested in the further detention of the refugees and they had one unanswerable argument, the same that Thomas Carney advanced in a letter 101 of April twelfth to Dole,102 that it was already too late in the season to re-

of the refugees. The following indicates in what spirit his communication

was received:

"While it is not deemed expedient to grant the authority for raising such a regiment, the Department (of War) appreciates none the less the unfortunate condition of these Indians . . . Commander of the Dept of Kansas will no doubt afford protection." (A.G.O., Old Files Section, B 1013 (V.S.) 1863, Jacket 2 of 15).

99 For popular criticism of the transfer of Indian Territory to the Depart- ment of Arkansas, see (Leavenworth) Daily Conservative, April 19, 23, 26 and July 10, 1864.

100 _ Hid., February 24, 1864.

101 O.I.A., General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1863-1864.

102 On the day following, the thirteenth, Dole referred to Usher a letter that he was proposing to send to Coffin containing instructions for immediate removal. The bill appropriating funds had then passed the Senate and was before the House.

Return of the Refugees

move prospective agriculturists. In Indian Territory, the spring opens in March. The law, appropriating the necessary funds, was not enacted until May. Never- theless, the senatorial advocates of removal persisted in prodding the Indian Office and, on April fourteenth, a resolution was passed requesting the president " to com- municate to the Senate the reasons, if any exist, why the refugee Indians in the State of Kansas are not re- turned to their homes." 103 The response, which Dole communicated to Usher, May 11, 1864, ought to have been disconcerting to more than one department of the government since it was a plain statement of discredit- able facts that funds had not been forthcoming and that the same causes that made the southern Indians refugees still operated, their country being exposed per- petually " to incursions of roving bands of rebels or hos- tile Indians." 104

The shortcomings of the military arrangement that had separated Indian Territory from Kansas became startlingly obvious when Coffin applied for an armed escort and found that Curtis could furnish him with one to the border only. General Steele was far away " at or near Shreveport " and therefore Coffin tele- graphed 105 to Dole, hoping that he might be able to get an order for troops direct from the War Department. The Red River expedition was in progress and it was not to be wondered at that Steele, absorbed in affairs of great import, affairs that were to terminate so dis-

103 Congressional Globe, 3810 Congress, ist Session.

104 O.I.A., Report Book, no. 13, pp. 408-409.

105 April 21, 1864, O.I.A., General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1863- 1864. With the same object in view, Coffin telegraphed once more on May tenth and again May thirteenth. His transportation was all ready and the only thing lacking was the assurance of military protection. Secretary Usher advised his not being too premature in moving the refugees ; but allowed him to act upon his own responsibility and judgment.

56 The Indian Under Reconstruction

astrously,106 was inattentive to Coffin's call. The super- intendent's preparations went on notwithstanding, the obstacles in his way multiplying daily ; for the refugees, informed as to the military situation, were averse to courting new and untried dangers,107 small-pox raged among the Seminoles,108 and he had little latitude in the expenditure of funds, Congress having so hedged its appropriation about with restrictions.10' He still pleaded for an additional armed force and his prayer was eventually answered. On May twenty-sixth, Stan- ton notified Usher that General Steele had been di- rected to furnish an escort from the Kansas border on- ward.110

The getting of the refugees ready for removal was, to Coffin's mind, the most difficult job he had ever un- dertaken. The Leased District Indians refused point- blank to go. Fort Gibson was not in the direction of home for them and they preferred to hazard subsisting themselves on the Walnut, where antelope and buffalo

106 On May nth., the Senate called for an investigation of the Red River disaster [Cong. Globe, 38th cong. ist sess., p. 2218].

107 Coffin to Dole, May 22, 1864, O.I. A., General Files, Southern Su- perintendency, 1863-1864; Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1864,

PP- 338-339-

108 Small-pox had appeared at Neosho Falls as early as September, 1863 and then had disappeared for a time. In the following spring, it broke out again with terrible virulence. "Great consternation at once seized and preyed upon the minds of these superlatively wretched exiles," wrote the attending physician, "offering large vantage-ground to the extension of the fearful malady. All were immediately vaccinated ; but unfortunately the virus, though reported good, proved inert, and the next supply but partially succeeded . . . " (A. V. Coffin to W. G. Coffin, August 25, 1864, Com- missioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1864, p. 307). The disease spread to Belmont and in many cases proved fatal (ibid.; Gookins to W. G. Coffin, October 20, 1864, ibid., p. 319).

109 Coffin to Dole, May 14, 1864, O.I.A., General Files, Southern Su- perintendency, 1863-1864; Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1864, PP- 337-338. The money was not to be spent in Kansas. See Dole to Coffin, May 7, 1864, ibid., pp. 336-337.

110O.I.A., General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1863-1864.

Return of the Refugees 57

ranged, to journeying thither.111 For a time it seemed impossible to procure enough teams.115 The Indians were " very fearful." Some of the Creeks had to be left behind sick at the Sac and Fox Agency and quite a lot of the Seminoles 113 at Neosho Falls "* No at- tempt was made, on this occasion, to lure the Quapaws and their neighbors from the Ottawa Reservation. Their home not being even passably safe,115 they were to remain north, for a period, with Agent Elder, their differences with their hosts being no longer cause for uneasiness.116 The procession, when it finally started,

111 Henry Smith, Coffin's clerk, to Dole, May 28, 1864, ibid., C 877. For an estimate of their number, see Coffin to Dole, March 21, 1864, ibid., C 754. Their faithful agent, E. H. Carruth, died April 23rd. and Coffin appointed temporarily in his place, John T. Cox (Coffin to Dole, April 27, 1864, ibid., Wichita, 1862-1871).

112 "Nearly three hundred teams were required . . . and these had to be secured and gathered up through the country wherever we could get them." Coffin to Dole, September 24, 1864, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1864, p. 303).

113Bowlegs had died recently and Long John, who succeded him as head chief, appealed for help to President Lincoln, March 10, 1864 (O.I.A., General Files, Seminole, 1858-1869, 8291). Pas-ko-fa, the second chief, seconded the appeal, basing his claim to assistance upon the indisputable fact that his people had been loyal to the United States in the face of desperate odds, while the few who had gone with the South had been taken unawares by Pike (ibid.).

114 In June, Smith reported their number as 550; but, in September, Agent Snow placed it at 470 (Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1864,

P- Si?)-

us "These Indians could not be returned to their homes this summer, as their country lies just south of the south line of Kansas, and in the worst district of country for guerillas and bushwhackers west of the Missouri river, and cannot be occupied by either Indians or whites who are in the least suspected of loyalty, until a military post, or stockade, or fort is established there to hold the country against the marauding bands that have infested it for the last three years. It is there where our supply trains are so frequently attacked, and where General Blunt's body-guard and brass band was captured and murdered in cold blood ..." (Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1864, pp. 304-305).

116 Apparently some o& the ill-feeling between them and the Ottawas had been allayed. They were now on the Ottawa allotted lands and Agent Elder reported, "There has been no uneasiness or complaint on the part

58 The Indian Under Reconstruction

included nearly five thousand refugees " and, by the end of May, it had reached, without molestation, the Osage Catholic Mission. There it awaited the coming of the supplementary escort.118

Meanwhile, affairs were in bad shape at Fort Gib- son. There was discord everywhere, between white and red people and between civilians and soldiery, and the food contractors were responsible for most of it.

of the Ottawas in consequence of such occupancy, except such as has been engendered by the counsels of whites who have a prospective interest in the future disposition of their lands." (ibid., p. 315)

117 Before starting out with his refugee train, Coffin attempted to secure the Creek consent to the Senate amendments to the treaty of 1863 and he called a council at the Sac and Fox Agency for the purpose. The mooted point was, the claim of the loyal Creeks about which Dole had consulted with Senator J. H. Lane in January (Dole to Lane, January 27, 1864, O.I. A., Report Book, no. 13, pp. 287-291). The loyal Creeks claimed national status an untenable position according to those, who, like Lane, wanted to force a cession in order to accommodate the Kansas tribes when removed. The Senate amendment to Article 4 of the treaty deprived the secessionist Creeks of all claims to the tribal lands (Resolution, March 8, 1864; Usher to Dole, March 23, 1864, O.I.A., Land Files, Treaty, Box 3, 1864-1866.

Concerning the council that Coffin held with the Creeks at the Sac and Fox Agency, the account, gleaned from the Leavenworth Daily Times and from the St. Louis Globe Democrat and published in Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1864, pp. 339-340, is sufficiently explicit. The Creeks resisted all blandishments and, as a matter of fact, never did accept the Senate alterations in their treaty. The treaty, in consequence, remained unratified although its binding force was occasionally subject for inquiry for many years afterwards. In illustration, see Byers to Lewis V. Bogy, February 7, 1867, O.I.A., General Files, Creek, 1860-1869, 694. Undoubted- ly, there were many people, who fain would have had the government pro- ceed as if it were a fully negotiated and finished treaty; but the Creeks were too wary. They would have none of it and yet, except for the objectionable amended fourth article, they deemed it a good treaty (Oc-ta-hasa Harjo and others to Dole, December 9, 1864).

While the treaty was pending in the Senate, "loyal Africans from the Creek Nation," through Israel Harris of the American Baptist Home Mis- sionary Society, asked that they be "guarantied" "equal rights with the Indians." All of their "boys" were in the army and ought to be remem- bered (Mundy Durant to Dole, February 23, 1864, O.I.A., General Files, Creek, 1860-1869, D 362).

118 Coffin to Dole, June 3, 1864, ibid., Southern Superiniendency, 1863- 1864, C895.

Return of the Refugees 59

Those were the days when cattle-stealing became a public scandal but more of it anon. The discord be- tween white and red people existed both inside and out- side the army. Inside the army, it was a matter as be- tween officers and men and was most apparent when Colonel Phillips took the Indian Brigade on an expe- dition towards the Red River early in the year. The bickerings that arose between the white officers and the Indian rank and file soon grew notorious and were chiefly caused by the disputed ownership of ponies.119 Litigation succeeded altercation and there was no end to the bad feeling engendered. Fortunately, the Indian plaintiff had friends at court in the person of govern- ment agents 12° and the brigade commander, Colonel Phillips standing well the test of "earnest and substan- tial friend." 121

119 j. X. Cox to Dole, February 5, 1864, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1864, p. 321.

120 Besides Special Agent Cox, there was with the expedition Special Agent Milo Gookins of Attica, Indiana, who had, in the preceding August, been sent by Coffin "to accompany the Indian regiments now with the Army of the Frontier, under command of Blunt, during their campaign in Indian Territory." (Coffin to Mix, August 31, 1863, O.I.A., General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1863-1864, C47i). Coffin had instructed Gookins to "en- quire carefully into the loyalty of all the prominent Indian chiefs, headmen, & braves, and keep a correct & full record of all their acts, standing & position towards the Federal Government ..." (Coffin to Gookins, August 19, 1863, ibid.). It was not a promising outlook and yet, in the spring of 1864, Gookins was disposed to be most magnanimous in his attitude towards the recalcitrants. On March 23rd., he wrote to Dole,

"I see by the papers that steps are being taken in Congress for the appointment of Commissioners to examine and adjust claims against the Government for losses sustained by the war, embracing all the States. I presume it will not have escaped the notice of the Interior Department, the Indian Bureau, or the Cherokee delegation that a similar bill for the Indian territories should be more liberal in its provisions, embracing hundreds, who by force of surrounding circum- stances, and under compulsion, might have appeared to be, and prob- ably to act disloyal, when in fact and in truth they were not so" (ibid.).

121 Cox to Dole, February 5, 1864, op. cit.

60 The Indian Under Reconstruction

The troubles caused by the contractors were more widespread and of more lasting effect. They grew out of peculations and the delivery of inferior goods. Flour furnished for the refugees, when inspected,122 was found to be worthless as far as its food properties and appetizing qualities were concerned. "Some of it was nothing but 'shorts,' the rest, the poorest flour manu- factured." Agent Harlan accepted it only because "the Indians had been over 30 days without bread," and he knew, if he rejected it, that "they would get none until spring."123 T. C. Stevens and Company were contractors in this affair and the only circum- stance that Coffin could offer in extenuation of their conduct was the great difficulty always "experienced in obtaining a good article of flour in southern Kansas . . . in consequence of the inferior character of the mills in that new and sparsely settled country . . ,"124 Similar complaints were made of the firm of Mac- Donald and Fuller.12* Was it any wonder that the

122 «i am informed by good authority from Kansas that some fourteen hundred sacks of flour has been condemned by a military tribunal in Kansas as worthless -that the flour was delivered to the Refugee Indians on a contract of Stevens & Co.

"I am further informed that the evidence in the case with samples of the flour has been forwarded to you. I propose to have that evidence & samples before the Indian Committee that they may fully realize with whom they are dealing in Kansas. I trust that you will retain the samples until the Indian Committee meets . . ." (J. H. Lane to Dole, March 14, 1864, O.I.A., General Files, Southern Su- perintendency, 1863-1864, 1,313).

123 Usher to Dole, March 7, 1864, communicating the statement of the inspectors, ibid., I 467.

124 Coffin to Dole, March 10, 1864, ibid.

125 The criminality of this firm was exposed later and with more pub- licity. For a copy of its original contract, see Coffin to Dole, April 13, 1864, ibid., C 778. Of the rival firm, Thomas Carney was a principal member. He had come from Ohio [Connelley, Standard History of Kansas and Kansans, pp. 764-768] and had early gained an unenviable reputation in business dealings. His friend and associate, Robert S. Stevens, was notorious for sharp practices, in the location of land warrants for eastern people, the

Return of the Refugees 61

refugees felt themselves neglected, abused, and out- raged?

The advance guard of Coffin's refugee train reached Fort Gibson June i^.126 Its progress had been ham- pered by minor vicissitudes, cattle thieves and thunder- storms, all natural to the region.127 The condition of affairs north of the Arkansas was at the time most un- satisfactory; for the Federals had military control of Forts Smith and Gibson only and "everything," so complained the superintendent, "done out of range of the guns of the forts has to be done under an escort or guard." The Creeks, who comprised the major por- tion of the refugees, could not be taken to their own country unless General Thayer should consent to erect a military post within its limits. For the time being they were, therefore, to remain with the Cherokees, a bad arrangement.128 The Chickasaws were to go east-

building of Indian houses, and the like. He had emigrated from New York and, in combination with S. N. Simpson and Charles Robinson, had inter- ested himself in the construction of the road that was "the beginning of the railroad troubles in Kansas [Robinson, Kansas Conflict, pp. 419-420.].

126 Coffin to Dole, June 16, 1864, O.I.A., General Files, Southern Su- perintendency, 1863-1864, C 922.

127 — ibid. ; same to same, June 7, 1864.

128 Old Sands, who was then head chief of the Loyal Creeks, would give Phillips no peace until he consented to lay the complaints of the Creek refugees before the department (Phillips to Usher, June 24, 1864, I. D. Files, Bundle, no. 52). Usher communicated the facts to the War Department, August 16, 1864. The leading chiefs, including Sands, addressed themselves July i6th to Dole as follows:

"We did not get here in time to raise anything for ourselves. We are therefore destitute of everything. Months intervene between the arrival of each train and the supplies they bring are barely sufficient to keep us alive from day to day . . . There are at least twenty thousand persons here to feed, all of whom will have to depend on the trains for all their subsistence except beef, and this winter when the trains must necessarily have to stop, our sufferings will be terrible in the extreme. Last winter the refugees who were here were re- duced to almost absolute starvation, so much so, that they were glad to hunt out the little corn that fell from the horses & mules of the mil- itary. Then there were large fields of corn south of this post, belong-

62 The Indian Under Reconstruction

ward to Fort Smith where they would be a trifle nearer home than would be the case were they to remain at Gibson. Their own country, though, was considerably far to the westward, beyond the Choctaw. It was now too late to put in regular crops and consequently sub- sistence would have to be furnished as before and at a far greater cost. Coffin estimated the number of refu- gees at close upon sixteen thousand and the expense, he feared, would "be truly enormous." The Indians would have to be put at once "on the shortest kind of rations." Coffee, sugar, vinegar, condiments and everything else that could by any manner of means be dispensed with would have to be "cut off altogether." The prospect was not encouraging and Coffin, almost at his wit's end, despairingly wrote that "the military have most wonderfully changed their tune."

There was soon occasion for more particular criti- cism of army practices. In April, General Blunt had issued an order, well-intentioned no doubt, restraining the Indians from selling their stock. He had likewise ordered the seizure of certain salt-works, "salines," the value of which to the Indians can be calculated only by reference to the prominence given in all early records to the salt-licks used in turn by buffalos, abor- gines, settlers.129 In the case of each of Blunt's orders, the immediate object in view was the benefit, not of pri-

ing to the rebels, which our soldiers took and gathered ; now there are none; the whole country is a waste, and the suffering must be much greater next winter than it was last, unless the most prompt and energetic steps are taken to procure and transport supplies to this place. "It was a terrible mistake that we were not brought down here in time to raise a crop for ourselves ... (O.I. A., General Files,

Creek, 1860-1869).

129 Hulbert, Historic Highways, vol. i, p. 106. Phillips seconded Smith Christie's appeal that the salt-works be restored (June 3, 1864, I. D. Register of Letters Received, C, p. 423) and Usher favorably recommended the matter to the attention of the War Department, June 15 and again

Return of the Refugees 63

vate individuals, but of soldiers. Moreover, as the In- dian crops matured, those same soldiers helped them- selves freely to grain and other produce, the outcome of the labour of "helpless women and children," and they did it quite regardless of Indian needs. A real grievance existed and the intervention of the War De- partment was besought for its redress.130 Things went from bad to worse. Illicit traffic in Indian cattle added its nefariousness to the general disorder and the con- duct of the military authorities was deemed as iniqui- tous as that of the contractors. Phillips himself did not pass muster. He was as unpopular with one set of men as Blunt was with another. Before long Indians, too, came to share in the cattle-driving. The Wichita Agency tribes 131 were the chief offenders and they stole

August 15, 1864 (ibid., D., p. 284; Letter Press Book, no. 6, pp. 90-92; Letter Book, no. 5, p. 20).

iso There were, perforce, some extenuating circumstances. Blunt was short of both men and food (Blunt to Curtis, April 6, 1864, Official Records, vol. xxxiv, part 3, p. 69). He was quite unable to meet the necessities of Phillips's command (Phillips to Curtis, April 5, 1864, ibid., pp. 52-53), which at first had recourse to the grain fields of the upper Canadian. The old question of the relationship of Indian Territory to Arkansas from the military point of view was still being bruited. On the sixteenth of April, Grant asked that their union be urged upon the president (Grant to Hal- leek, April 16, 1864, ibid., p. 178) and he gained his point immediately. Blunt was then ordered back to Curtis (ibid., p. 192). The need of a restraining order to protect the Cherokee produce developed very shortly thereafter and continued unabated throughout the summer (Harlan to Dole, July 30, 1864, Coffin to Dole, August 8, 1864, O.I. A., General Files, Cherokee, 1859-1865, C 987, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1864, pp. 345-346; Mix to Usher, August 15, 1864, ibid., pp. 344-345, Indian Office Report Book, no. 13, p. 507, I. D. Register of Letters Received, D, p. 284; Smith Christy to Coffin, September 7, 1864, O.I.A., General Files, Cherokee, 1859-1865, C 1045 ; Harlan to Dole, September 30, 1864, ibid., H 956 of 1864).

131 The Wichitas turned to cattle-stealing to relieve their necessities. Sickness had prevented many of them from going out on the usual fall hunt (Coffin to Dole, October 27, 1864, O.I. A., General Files, Wichita, 1862-1871, CiO94; Gookins to Dole, April 24, 1865, ibid., 6258 of 1865). Milo Gookins, who had taken charge of these Indians in July (Secretary of the Interior to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, July 22, 1864), reported

64 The Indian Under Reconstruction

from the Creek country mostly; but they also made excursions into the Cherokee and down into Texas. White men went frequently with them. It was com- monly supposed that few of such raiders ever returned alive ; but the profits were worth the risk. And there was raiding in other directions. Supply trains pre- ferred to go unescorted; for the military guard had more than once been a raiding party in disguise. Every- thing conduced to confusion.132

that settlers paid liberally for the gathering up of other people's cattle and were the prominent men of the vicinity. He wrote from Butler County, Kansas (Gookins to Coffin, November 14, 1864, ibid., Southern Superintend- ency, 1863-1864, €1143). Coffin was inclined to condone the cattle-driving when it was confined to "Texas and that part of the Indian Territory exclusively under rebel control and where the stock all falls into the hands of rebels and is used to prolong the war . . . ' (Coffin to Gookins, December 3, 1864, ibid.). Gookins' relations with Colonel J. H. Leavenworth, Special Agent for the Kiowas and Comanches, were not amicable. He came to suspect Leavenworth of stirring up disaffection among the Wichitas (Gookins to Sells, October 31, 1865, ibid., Wichita, 1862-1871, 8827) and he highly disapproved of a plan, credited to Leavenworth, for settling the Comanches, so recently hostile, on the Arkansas (Gookins to Coffin, Novem- ber 25, 1864, ibid., Southern Superintendency, 1863-1864, Cii43). The Wichitas were still miserably destitute in 1866 (Cooley to Harlan, June 23, 1866, O.I.A., Report Book, no. 15, p. 334. See also pp. 388, 487, 495). 132 The following documents illustrate the point:

(a) "Stand Watie has captured government train at Cabin Creek, three hundred troops and two hundred fifty teamsters. Have troops sent to Gibson at once. All demoralized on the bor.ler. Something must be done or Indians will cause trouble. Our loss sixty thousand dollars." (Telegram from Perry Fuller to Dole, dated Leavenworth, September 20, 1864). There were those who unfavorably contrasted the Federal treatment of the Indians with the Confederate, the Con- federate, that is, as instanced in the elevation of this same Stand Watie to a brigadier-generalship (John W. Stapler to Usher, dated Philadelphia, June 22, 1864, O.I.A., General Files, Cherokee, 1859- 1865, 8389).

(b) "... I have just come in from the train with despatches to Col. Blair &c. All is confusion. The soldiers are regularly organ- ized into a mob and swear no train shall go down. We shall start in the morning anyhow. I take back despatches from Col. Blair. Night before last the sutlers were robbed. Fuller lost heavily. They went through me. I lost six thousand dollars worth of tobacco. Last night they made another attack on Fuller's train, took one box worth

Return of the Refugees 65

Moreover, there was suffering nearly everywhere. Positive destitution made its appearance in July. It

six hundred dollars. The Indians pitched into them and drove them back. Had a nice little fight. The Indians swear they will fight for the train to the last. Sent this morning for the Indians from Gibson to come on and meet us. Capt. Anderson is here from the Indians. Our escort swear they will not fight if they meet the enemy. Dennison refuses to send any troops to our assistance. Blair gives up, says he can do nothing. The only redress is to stop the pay of the escort. It is one of the most high-handed outrages ever committed. Will you see Gen. Curtis and see what can be done in the matter?

"Vail's teams have turned back from Coxe's Creek. I stopped them and then went back to the escort for assistance in making them go on. Capt. Anderson came out and tried to get them to come back, made them all kinds of offers. But as he was not in command of the escort and as Capt. Ledger had gone back to Ft. Scott for assistance he could do nothing. Blair says to make them go back but they are now too near Ft. Scott to make the connection. I would not pay him one cent for he has acted the dog. It is true the mob went up and stole all their outfit, blankets, clothes, provisions and even whips. But Capt. Anderson offered to furnish them with everything and we made them all kinds of offers. The soldiers do not take because they want the property only, but they destroy all they can lay their hands on, took 600 pounds of soda and scattered it all over the prairie, also 200 pounds of matches. Last night they tried to burn up the train. Our only hope is in the Indians. I would write more but am in a hurry to start back. Don't know the extent of the loss but must be thirty or forty thousand dollars. I think you may count on this train not getting through ..." (Cutler to Coffin, November 24, 1864, O.I.A., General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1863-1864, CnjS).

(c) "... I have just returned from Fort Scott by way of Hum- bolt & the Neosho Valley. We have succeeded in getting off a train of supplies for the Indians at Fort Gibson under most discouraging circumstances. After making the propositions of which I advised you to furnish flour and corn, Carney and Stevens declined and Fuller & McDonald are trying to comply. With what aid I could give them, we had secured about six thousand bushels of corn and two thousand sacks of flour. We had engaged transportation enough to take it all, but just as we were to commence loading on the 9th and loth of Novem- ber there came one of the severest rain, hail, and snow storms ever known in this country, which entirely disheartened and backed out more than half our teams. We succeeded in getting teams enough to load all the goods you and Harlan purchased in New York which were a month overtime in getting here.

"After loading all the teams we could procure at Baldwin City with

66 The Indian Under Reconstruction

was then that Coffin resented the expenditure of money for the support of John Ross and the rest of the Chero-

corn, I went immediately to Fort Scott and succeeded in detaining the military train and escort one week for our teams that were behind to come up, but owing to the extreme bad road and bad weather more than half of them did not reach there in time and we were compelled to unload and discharge them at Fort Scott, and part of them returned. After joining the train as you will see by the enclosed letter from Major G. A. Cutler and Mr. Vail, the troops that have been in are still escorting trains from Fort Scott to Forts Gibson and Smith and have become demoralized that there is no longer any safety in sending trains under them. They commenced robbing the wagons in open daylight before they left the camp near Fort Scott, and openly declared they would not suffer a loaded wagon to reach Fort Gibson. (It is due candor to say, those troops belong to General Steele's department, no difficulty of the kind has been incurred with troops under General Curtis, who I am bound to say has always cooperated with me and has at all times promptly given us all the aid and assistance in his power, with the limited means and number of troops at his command. His district only extends to the southern boundary of Kansas just where danger begins.) It is most exceedingly unfortunate that General Curtis' district does not include the Indian Territory. Had such been the case the last year I am very sure that the results of our Indian operations would have been very different.

"I have just learned from Gen'l Curtis that our train is halted at Hudson's Crossing of the Neosho, from a report that a large rebel force had crossed the Arkansas above Fort Gibson and were marching towards the train. They had sent out scouts to ascertain the truth and were waiting the result. I very much fear the train will have to return which will entail upon us a very heavy expense, and what the Indians will do in the mean time, it is hard to foretell. I greatly fear they will all be back in Kansas again before the country can be suf- ficiently cleared to enable us to send down another train.

"Immediately on starting the train from Fort Scott I commenced get- ting up another train and have secured four thousand bushels of corn and four hundred sacks of flour in addition to what was left at Bald- win City and Fort Scott and have now engaged about one hundred and fifty teams and am engaging all that can be had.

"Should the present train get through safe and another start in two or three weeks I fondly hope to be able to get enough breadstuff down to prevent suffering till supplies can reach them by water.

"But from all the facts now before us I am constrained to say, that unless some more efficiency can be infused into the military operations in the Indian Territory all our efforts to supply those unfortunate Refugees must end in failure, for no prudent men would take their teams and property under the escort of what practically amounts to

Return of the Refugees 67

kee delegation in Washington.133 The Commissioner of Indian Affairs tried to get Choctaw bonds diverted to refugee relief.134 When the autumn came, clothing and blankets 13S were solicited as well as food. Appealed to for the amelioration of an all too-evident distress, President Lincoln gave his approval to the making of purchases on credit.136 In Kansas, conditions among the Indians were equally bad. The Seminoles at Neosho Falls were reported naked and famishing in August.137 Earlier yet a cry of want had come from the Weas, Peorias, Kaskaskias, and Piankeshaws, whose lands were on the Missouri border and subject to raids and whose funds had not materialized during the war. They had been invested in interest-bearing stock by the

an organized band of paid and fed robbers." (Coffin to Dole, Decem- ber i, 1864, ibid.).

133 I. D., Register of Letters Received, D, p. 282.

134 At the suggestion of the Indian Office, the Secretary of the Interior opened up a correspondence with the Treasury Department, August n, 1864, with that end in view (ibid.). For later stages of the proposal, see the history of Senate Resolution, no. 85, Cong. Globe, 38th cong., 2nd sess., pp. 967,1336,1420. Senator Doolittle, June n, 1864 (Cong. Globe, 38th cong., ist sess., p. 2869) had moved an amendment to the pending Indian appropriation bill which was substantially a confiscation of Indian annuities for the relief of refugees. The recommendation was no new thing and the use of seces- sionist Indian funds for such a purpose had been authorised much earlier.

135 Harlan to Dole, September 30, 1864 (O.I.A., General Files, Cherokee, 1859-1865, 11957); Cutler to Dole, October 3, 1864, (ibid., Southern Su- perintendency) .

136 See Lincoln's endorsement on the department letter of October i, 1864, "Understanding that persons giving credit in this case will have

no strictly legal claim upon the government, yet the necessity for it is so great and urgent, that I shall most cheerfully urge upon Congress that such credit and claims fairly given and made shall be recognized and paid." (I. D., Register of Letters Received, D, p. 293). Agent Harlan was instructed to buy on credit in New York thirty thousand dollars worth of clothing and Coffin in Kansas one hundred and seventy thousand dollars worth of food (Otto, Acting Secretary of the Interior, to Dole, October i, 1864).

137 Snow to Dole, August 8, 1864 (O.I.A., General Files, Seminole, 1858- 1869). The account of Carney & Stevens against the Seminoles alone was $7563.21. See Snow's voucher for the same (ibid.).

68 The Indian Under Reconstruction

United States government and, in some mysterious way and without consultation with the Indians, had been converted, just previous to the outbreak of hostilities, into stock of the secessionist states. There were those in Congress who repudiated every idea of responsi- bility resting upon the government for the substitution and, while senators quibbled over whether relief should be furnished as of right or as a matter of charity, the despoiled and too-trusting Indians starved.138

A disposition to shirk responsibility did not reveal itself in connection with the matter of the substituted stocks only but came out again in the Senate debate on the condition and treatment of the restored refugees, restored only in the sense that they had been taken back into the Indian country. An item in the annual Indian appropriation bill carried seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars for their relief. It was no mean figure and it was based as much upon past expenditures as up- on present needs.139 Senator Brown considered that the

138 Co ng. Globe, 38th cong., ist sess., pp. 1154, 1207, 1454, 2050, 2405, 2869-2870, 2873, 2874-2875, 2877, 3219, etc. The obligation of the govern- ment to stand surety for investments of Indian trust funds was debated in 1854 (ibid., 33rd Cong., ist sess., pp. 1026-1027).

139 On January n, 1865, Doolittle called upon Usher for complete returns as to the expense of removing, subsisting, and protecting refugees (I. D. Files, Bundle, no. 53). March 28th, Dole applied to Coffin for more statistical information (O.I.A., Letter Book, no. 76, p. 497). As it happened, Coffin sent some such the very next day but it was entirely based upon the accounts of the last December (ibid., Southern Superintendency).

Cherokee Justin Harlan, Agt.

1. Now drawing rations , 9,900

2. To draw rations when mustered out of Guards 2,000

Creeks and Euchees _ G. A. Culler, Agt.

1. Now drawing rations „ 6,000

2. To draw rations when mustered out of Guards 1,500

Seminoles under care of Creek Agt.

1. Now drawing rations 300

2. To draw rations when mustered out of Guards 100

Choctaius and Chickasa<uvs Isaac Smith, Agt.

i. Number drawing rations _ 900

Return of the Refugees 69

Indians had less claim upon the generosity - if that be what it should be called - of the government than had the people of Missouri, his constituents, or than had the unpaid soldier everywhere.140 Doolittle disputed the point by recalling the circumstances of the abandon- ment by the United States, the consequent exposure to intimidation and attack, and the expulsion from home with all its attendant miseries. The terrible havoc wrought in the Cherokee country he expatiated upon with vigor, contending that the argument put up by the opposition to the effect that the spoliation, desolation, destruction were the work of Indians, guilty of defection, only made the matter worse for the government and the consequent obligation resting upon it all the greater; since the United States had sworn to protect against both foreign and domestic foe.1*1 Brown's concluding charge that three-fourths of the ''donation" would, in his belief, "go in the shape of

Coffin's accompanying remarks are of interest as showing how rapidly the Indians were deserting the Confederate cause. In June only about seventy Choctaws and Chickasaws were receiving rations at Fort Smith. Coffin anticipated that the number might swell to five thousand by July.

The congressional appropriation as made fell very far short of needs and expectations (Usher to Dole, March 20, 1865). The alarm of the field employees can be deduced from an unofficial letter that P. P. Elder sent to Dole from Ohio City, Kansas, March 18, 1865. He had been subsisting his charges on credit and he feared that, as a result of the meagre appropriation, "a squabble will ensue <who is to be paid first" For further information about the condition at Neosho Agency, see Neosho, W 896 of 1865 and 8714 of 1865.

For a list of the people to whom rations were distributed at Fort Gibson, April, 1865, see A.G.O., Fort Gibson File-box, 1864-1868.

140 Cong. Globe, 38th cong., 2nd sess., p. 1299.

141 Proof of this promise, variously phrased, is to be found in the fol- lowing extracts from treaties: The list is not exhaustive.

"The United States are obliged to protect the Choctaws from domestic strife and from foreign enemies ..." (Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, 1830, article v, Kappler, vol. ii, p. 311) ;

"... they also agree to protect them in their new residence, against all interruption or disturbance from any other tribe or nation

70 The Indian Under Reconstruction

fraudulent contracts," it was not so easy to refute and Doolittle discreetly ignored it. Like Banquo's ghost, however, it was bound to reappear; for charges against the contractors 142 and their accomplices or abettors were constantly being insinuated if not formally lodged. The whole matter would have to be threshed

of Indians or from any other person or persons whatever." (Quapaw Treaty of 1833, article ii, Kappler, vol. ii, p. 396).

"... hereby consent to protect and defend them against the inroads of any other tribe of Indians, and from the whites ; and agree to keep them without the limits of any State or Territory. The Chickasaws pledge themselves never to make war upon any Indian people, or upon the whites, unless they are so authorized by the United States. But if war be made upon them, they will be permitted to defend themselves, until assistance be given to them by the United States, as shall be the case." (Chickasaw Treaty of 1834, article ii, Kappler, vol. ii, p. 418).

"... The United States agree to protect the Cherokee nation from domestic strife and foreign enemies and against intestine wars between the several tribes ..." (Treaty of New Echota, 1835, article vi, Kappler, vol. ii, p. 442).

"The United States shall protect the Choctaws and Chickasaws from domestic strife, from hostile invasion, and from aggression by other Indians and white persons not subject to their jurisdiction and laws; and for all injuries resulting from such invasion or aggression, full indemnity is hereby guaranteed to the party or parties injured, out of the Treasury of the United States, upon the same principle and according to the same rules upon which white persons are entitled to indemnity for injuries or aggressions upon them, committed by In- dians." (Treaty of 1855, article xiv, Kappler, vol. ii, p. 710).

Exactly the same provision as the one immediately preceding is to be found in the Creek and Seminole Treaty of 1856, article xviii [Kappler, vol. ii, p. 762].

142 The firm of McDonald and Fuller was continually under fire of criticism and the ill-feeling between its members and Colonel Phillips was most pronounced and bitter. When the Creeks complained of the kind and quality of goods furnished them, McDonald and Fuller charged that Phillips was at the bottom of the whole matter, he being, so they claimed, a secret partner in the Ross sutler business (McDonald and Fuller to Coffin, March ii, 1865; Coffin to Dole, March 13, 1865; Cutler to Coffin, March 13, 1865, O.I.A., General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1865, Ci279). Ewing and Browning, attorneys for the Cherokees, asked, March 18, 1865, that "a requisition from W. G. Coffin now pending at the Treasury be suspended until they can have an opportunity to prove that the claim of McDonald and Fuller and others is fraudulent" (ibid., Cherokee, 1859-1865, £70). John

Return of the Refugees 71

out, investigated thoroughly, ere many moons had passed.

The abuses of the system, supposing that the way the refugees were provided for can be distinguished by so dignified a name, were all the time creeping out. Charges and countercharges against individuals as re- sponsible for the abuses were of disgusting and ap- palling frequency and, even if large allowance be made for personal malice, tribal animosities, trade rivalries as well as for the old Indian distrust of white men and for the old jealousy between civil and military authori- ties there was yet enough to merit the strongest oppro- brium then and now. The money was going and yet there was absolutely no visible alleviation of misery. There was much of truth in Senator Sherman's ob- servations that " if we could protect them (the In- dians) from our own race, if we could leave them alone without a dollar, with no white man, woman, or child within fifty miles of them, they could take better care of themselves than we could with all our appropria- tions for them. Their troubles have grown out of their contact with white men ... I do not know but that we had better bring these fifteen thousand Indians to the city of New York and send them to the Astor House or some other comfortable place and take care of them. The same rule applied to the support of all

W. Wright wrote to Usher in similar wise, March i8th, "I do know that the claim of McDonald & Fuller for which it is proposed to place money in the hands of W. G. Coffin is an outrageous swindle.

"That corn to the amount of 10,000 bushels was purchased of the Cherokees at less than $3 per bushel and immediately turned out at $12 to other Cherokees . . .

"That 7/8 of the beef furnished refugees was stolen from the In- dians ..." (ibid.).

Usher called in the vouchers preparatory to an investigation (Usher to Dole, April 7, 1865, ibid.) and shortly afterwards the accused parties attempted a defense by recriminations against Phillips. See particularly H. E. McKee to Coffin, April 20, 1865, ibid., Southern Superintendency.

72 The Indian Under Reconstruction

the people of the United States would ruin us as a na- tion in six months . . .

A particular instance of the mismanagement and shortsightedness of the powers that were is to be found in the very location of refugees other than Cherokee.1** The Creeks were detained near Fort Gibson and, in the dead of winter, were encamped on the west side of the Grand River in a low wet swamp within two or three miles of their own boundary.145 The pretext for their detention was that the government could not protect them far from the fort. Within sight of home,146 pre- cariously sustained by what was, in popular ignorance dubbed charity, they yet had the mortification of know- ing that their country was being denuded of its cattle and that very cattle sold by contractors to the govern- ment for refugee consumption. Military authorities regarded the cattle as contraband, not so the Indians.14' It was their opinion that all property left in the Creek country ought rightfully to belong to that part of the Nation that had remained loyal.148

143 Cong. Globe, 38th cong., and. sess., p. 1300.

144 January 30, 1865, Coffin forwarded to Dole a letter from Agent Harlan (O.I.A., General Files, Southern Superintendency, C 1197 °f J86s) loudly protesting against the policy of congregating the refugees within the Cherokee country where they were not and could not be, in the very nature of things, safer than in their own or so well provided for.

145 Ok-ta-hasas Harjo to Dole, January n, 1865, O.I.A., General Files, Creek, 1860-1869.

146 Just after this complaint was made, Chief Sands and some of his people crossed the Verdigris River into their own country and there started a sort of colony, the "further bound" of which was the Tallahassee Mission (Presbyterian), some twelve miles distant, where Phillips stationed a mil- itary outpost. His command had by that time been reduced to Indians alone (Phillips to Dole, February 27, 1865, O.I.A., Land Files, Creek, Box 45). Phillips solicited seed corn for their use (Dole to Coffin, March 24, 1865, ibid., Letter Book, no. 76, p. 469), probably some of that that the Indian Office expected to purchase at twelve dollars a bushel (Cong. Globe, 38th cong., 2nd. sess., p. 1300).

147 See Creek petition transmitted by Ross to Lincoln, February 15, 1865, O.I.A., General Files, Southern Superintendency.

148 Ok-ta-hasas Harjo to Dole, January n, 1865, op. cit.

III. CATTLE-DRIVING IN THE INDIAN COUNTRY

Much of the dissatisfaction existing among the re- stored refugees was attributable to cattle-stealing which, since i862,149 had become a regular frontier in- dustry, participated in by civilians, more or less re- spectable, and by soldiery. Viewed in its proper light as a gross infringement upon the property rights of the Indians, it represented practices altogether criminal, incompatible with ever so loose an interpretation of treaty guarantees, yet tacitly condoned and, at times, even connived at and shared in by agents of the United States government. By 1865, it had reached such scan- dalous proportions that right-thinking people took alarm for well might its longer continuance prove in- imical to the future maintenance of law and order. To sane and sober private citizens north of the line, as to certain army leaders south, it began to seem incredible that the government dared to put itself in the position of one compounding a felony.

In ante-bellum days, Indian Territory had been well- stocked. The individual slaveholding tribes, without exception, were rich in cattle, swine, and ponies; but particularly so in cattle. The passing of southern troops across their domain had offered the first occasion for spoliation, the hog-pens being pretty generally plundered.150 It was the fortune of war, the price that

149 Blunt to Harlan, May 16, 1866, I. D. Files, Bundle, no. 56.

150 Carruth and Martin to Coffin, July 25, 1862, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1862, p. 160.

74 The Indian Under Reconstruction

had to be paid by a helpless people for strategic posi- tion and the Indians, although they felt their losses keenly, accepted them stoically. Their flourishing ba- con trade soon showed diminishing returns and, finally dwindled almost to nothing. Then came the time when, after a period of hesitancy, the Cherokees had joined forces with the Confederacy. The whole of Indian Territory was thenceforth virtually in the hands of the South and the material resources of the region at its disposal. In consequence, Indian live-stock was regu- larly requisitioned. Not only the geographical posi- tion but the grain and the stock and the countless other needful things that the Indian country abounded in made the securing of it desirable and the alienation of it unthinkable. It was not to be marvelled at, there- fore, that the resources when once made available, in virtue of the alliance, were immediately drawn upon to the fullest possible extent. The Indians acquiesced. It was still the fortune of war.

The Federal troops reached Tahlequah, July 1862. After a duration of about ten months all told, the Cher- okee alliance with the South was, so far as the Prin- cipal Chief and the full bloods were concerned, at an end, notwithstanding that the treaty was not at once abrogated 151 and that the Ridge faction, led by Stand Watie and his nephew, E. C. Boudinot, continued loyal to its promises. Divided interests and divided councils worked as always great havoc. The Cherokee country became the legitimate prey of both armies, Cherokee cattle the victims of constant marauding.152 The freed

151 The treaty was abrogated officially, February, 1863, ibid., 1863, p. 227.

152 "... The rebel army, bushwhackers, and guerillas are not the worst enemies the Indians have. While the rebels, bushwhackers, and guerillas have taken horses, cattle, hogs, corn, and other crops - all they wanted - white men, loyal, or pretending to be so, have taken

Cattle -Driving in the Indian Country 75

blacks had a share, too, in the general robbery. They were reported by the Federals as pillaging "indis- criminately, as well from the Union Indians as from the rebels." 153 Beyond the Arkansas lay the country of the Choctaws and Chickasaws, allies of the South. Their property the Federals regarded as legally con- traband ; but even if so it ought not to have been sub- ject, as it regularly was, to individual reprisal.154 The private citizen acted as if he had as good a right to it as the government.

For the seizing of the live-stock, white men em- ployed irresponsible parties, usually Indians,15" the

five times as much, and all kinds of stock has been driven north and west, and sold ..." (ibid., 1864, p. 309). isa Carruth and Martin to Furnas, July 25, 1862, ibid., 1862, p. 161. is* (a) "... This I consider very decidedly less objectionable than when they were taking them from a country comparatively loyal. And as all my efforts and those of the military authorities have utterly failed to stop, or even check the traffic, I have, on consultation with General Curtis, adopted the policy of granting permits to a few respectable and responsible men to purchase cattle of the Indians, under all the restrictions and liabilities enforced by the United States laws regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, and requiring them, in addition thereto, to take bills of sale of the stock purchased ..." (Coffin to Dole, September 24, 1864, ibid., 1864, p. 306).

(b) " . . . The contraband portion of these cattle belong either to the loyal Indians of the respective Territories, or to the general government, and certainly no one individual has a permanent right over another to take them and convert them to his own private use, and any discrimination in that way, by raising ambition in others, I think is calculated only to make matters worse ..." (Gookins to Coffin, October 20, 1864, ibid., p. 320).

155 Among the Indians employed were Shawnees, Kickapoos and others [Carruth to Coffin, September 6, 1863, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1863, p. 186.] besides the Leased District tribes. The Shawnees involved were presumably the so-called Absentees, who were the Missouri as distinguished from the Ohio Shawnees. It was mainly with the latter that the Manypenny treaty of 1854 (Kappler, vol. ii, pp. 614-618) had been made (Senate Doc., no. 269, 59th cong., 2nd. sess., serial no. 5072), notwith- standing that the former had had the prior and the better title to the Kansas lands coveted and ceded (Abel, Indian Reservations in Kansas, pp. 7, 22).

76 The Indian Under Reconstruction

less-civilized of the Leased District,156 forsooth, or

The Absentee Shawnees had wandered southward and, failing to return within the time most unfairly set by the treaty, had been held, by pres- idential proclamation in 1863, deprived of their title. Naturally, legal procedure of the sort was incomprehensible to them and they were now in defiant mood. The Kickapoos were similarly in the position of an aggrieved party. Their troubles antedated the outbreak of the war, some of them being due to the fact that they had preferred to have established among them the Methodist Episcopal Church South and had had their wishes thwarted by Walter Lowrie, the indefatigible agent of the Presby- terian Board of Foreign Missions (O.I.A., Schools, 864 of 1859; 6150 of 1860; RIOIS of 1860; 8258 of 1860). In 1862, Agent Charles B. Keith had negotiated with them a treaty of cession and of contemplated removal to the country south of Kansas. It was charged that he had used coercive means and had worked in the interests of the Atchison and Pike's Peak Railway Company. He was succeeded by Abram Bennett as agent and meanwhile the treaty was held up. Many parties had solicited the sus- pension of its execution (Benj. F. Loan to Dole, March 29, 1864, O.I. A., General Files, Kickapoo, 1855-1865) and W. W. Guthrie, Attorney-General of Kansas and a director of "Jeff. Thompson's old Rail Road Co." reorgan- ized, had journeyed to Washington to secure its annulment. He was in the pay of citizens of St. Joseph, Missouri and of the northern tier of Kansas counties and was opposed by Congressman S. C. Pomeroy (ibid., P 64 of 1863). At the time of the Kickapoo emigration from Indiana, some of the tribe separated from the main band and went on beyond the thirty-seventh parallel (Edward Wolcott to Dole, December 15, 1864, ibid., Kickapoo, 1855- 1865, W748). Those radically averse to the Keith treaty joined forces with them (ibid.; Annual Report of Superintendent Wm. M. Albin, October i, 1864, O.I.A., Land Files, Central Superintendency, 1852-1869, Box 10, A 865). The malcontents were estimated at fully one-half of the tribe. A small group, as anxious to get away from the Kansans as the Kansans were to get rid of them, prepared to start off with the untrustworthy Keith, in the late spring of 1864, to select a new home (Loan to Dole, March 29, 1864). These or other hapless wanderers were soon accused of "being engaged with other Indians in their murderous raids in western Kan- sas. . ." (Wolcott to Dole, August 20, 1864, O.I. A., General Files, Kick- apoo, 1855-1865, W 603 ; Bennett to Albin, September 20, 1864, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1864, p. 373). The charge was quite unfounded; but there was some reason to think that an effort was being made "to involve all the Indian tribes in Kansas in a war with the Government." (Wolcott to Dole, August 20, 1864).

156 The Reserve Indians seem to have been early engaged in the traffic; but Agent Carruth, by the fall of 1863, thought he had influenced them against it (Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1863, p. 186). The death of Agent Carruth and the delay of his successor, Milo Gookins, in taking office (ibid., 1864, p. 319) apparently caused their dispersion and, to some extent, their resumption of pernicious practices.

Cattle-Driving in the Indian Country 77

wandering Kickapoos,157 Shawnees, and Delawares, none of whom had any compunctions in the matter but treated it as sport and as a gainful occupation. Most of them had no property of their own to lose, being homeless, and some had a grievance of long-standing against the Choctaws and Chickasaws. Some of the stock was driven north into Kansas 158 and there dis- posed of; some, the army applied to its own needs;159 but by far the largest portion went into the hands of contractors, who sold it to the government for the use of the refugees 16° and at a most exorbitant figure. Pro- fiteering on so enormous a scale and conducted with such shameless audacity had surely never before been known in that locality or anywhere on the frontier. After a time the pillagers grew bolder and laid violent hands upon the stock of the loyal Cherokees and Creeks.161 To capture the Creek stock undisturbed was

157 The Kickapoos engaged themselves in the nefarious business very early. In the summer of 1862, they were reported as bringing in at one time about a thousand head of horses and ponies, which the Creeks claimed were stolen (Dally Conservative, June 19, 1862, quoted from the Fort Scott Bulletin).

158 Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1864, pp. 309, 312.

159 The army was accused of wastefulness and utilized the butchered cattle very much as white hunters utilized the buffalo. Travellers record that the prairies were sometimes strewn with the carcasses of buffalo slaughtered just for sport, the more dainty morsels like the tongue of the cow having been the only portions used. In 1863, Agent Proctor reported on the army use of cattle thus:

"Cattle are yet abundant in the nation, although the consumption of the army has been enormous as well as wasteful. I have known a small party of our scouts to shoot down a large fat ox for a fe<w slices of steak, and leave the rest for the wolves ..." (ibid., 1863, p. 224).

160 In making his estimates for the subsistence of the refugees, Coffin had counted upon the Indians using their own meat (ibid., 1864, p. 323).

161 Ibid., 1863, pp. 186, 197; 1864, p. 316. The following letters illus- trate the despoiling of the Creeks as reported by agents to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs:

(a) "About the i6th ult. Major Colman and myself, together with

78 The Indian Under Reconstruction

not a difficult undertaking since the Creeks, removed from Kansas, had not been suffered to go to their own homes to look after their possessions. Fully aware that they were being sold at the very highest of prices their very own cattle, they were yet obliged to linger in the Cherokee country, the pretext of their guardian being that in no other way could they be protected. Their indignation, their resentment, and their consciousness of intolerable wrong can easily be imagined.

From time to time, through the years just passed, complaints, made their way to Washington and, be-

a large number of our Indians, started for Humboldt, Kansas, the headquarters of the Military in southwestern Kansas, to recover, if possible, some cattle belonging to the Southern Refugee Indians, which we had understood were at that place.

"We found, on reaching there, that a large amount of cattle, var- iously estimated from five hundred to a thousand head, had been driven from the Indian Country by irresponsible persons, the greater portion of which, it was thought, had fallen into the hands of spec- ulators. Major Colman and myself succeeded in recovering one hundred and thirteen head of cattle at that place which we turned over to our Indians, the owners ..." (Cutler to Dole, June 30, 1863, O.I.A., General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1863-1864, C36o).

(b) "Hearing that a large number of cattle belonging to the Southern Refugee Indians had been brought from the Indian Ter- ritory to southern Kansas, by irresponsible parties, claiming them as Sesech cattle, a portion of these cattle was seized by the military authorities at Humboldt, Kansas. Major Cutler and myself with a portion of the Indians under our charge went to Humboldt where we called on Captain Doudna Commandant of the Post and filed a descriptive list of the cattle claimed by our Indians. We then in company with Captain Doudna took the Indians to the herd to examine the cattle. They selected one hundred and thirteen head, all of which was branded with the brand of the respective claimants. We then turned them over to the Indians. They drove them to this place, [Sac and Fox Agency] where they herded them a few days and then sold them, each owner selling his cattle or retaining them for milch cows, at his option. We heard of another drove of the same descrip- tion of cattle going north. We followed them to Clinton and found a few head belonging to the Creek Indians. The owner of the drove paid them for their cattle." (Coleman to Dole, July 12, 1863, ibid.).

Cattle-Driving in the Indian Country 79

ginning with 1864, were of so serious a character that they could no longer be safely ignored. Army men, although one-time offenders themselves and still so on occasion, professed to be horrified at the extent of the illicit traffic. Their sensitiveness may, in the original instance, have been kindled by personal antipathy to certain contractors who had encroached upon the pre- serves of the army sutlers; but their moral sense de- veloped with their honest appreciation of the righteous- ness of the cause which they had espoused. They im- pugned the motives of government officials of all ranks; they implicated particular persons of high posi- tion in a general charge of wrong-doing, while most of their own offences they were able satisfactorily to account for.

The autumn of 1864 found things in a bad way in the Indian country. The backwardness of the spring, the summer drought, swarms of grasshoppers, chinch- bugs and innumerable other insect pests had all affected the Kansas crops 162 upon which those entrusted with the care of the refugees had expected to place their chief reliance. The Red River expedition, conducted by Generals Banks and Frederick Steele, had ended in egregious disaster. Its failure had dealt a terrific blow to refugee restoration under Federal auspices.163 Fur- thermore, it had obviously prevented a rather general stampede of secessionist Indians from the Confederate ranks.164 On the eve of its being undertaken, they were about to desert in a body; for they were disgusted with and greatly affronted by the treatment that had been accorded them and were not only dubious but actually

162 Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1864, pp. 312, 348, 354, 386.

163 — Ibid., p. 314.

164 — Ibid., p. 313.

80 The Indian Under Reconstruction

despairing of the eventuality of a Southern victory. They staked their dice on one last throw and the almost undreamed-of success justified an entire change in their plans. Their spirits were buoyed up anew. Not sur- prising, is it, that Colonel Phillips thought" them - they were chiefly Choctaws and Chickasaws - absolutely unreliable and that he, in consequence of their fluctuat- ing tendencies and their flouting of his friendly ad- vances, grew vindictive and advised 165 against making any terms with them until they had been made to rue their own original defection? As already narrated, he vehemently objected to a favorable reception of the New Hope conventionists ; for he was not willing, as was the just and magnanimous president, whose am- nesty proclamation he had been industriously circulat- ing,166 to build a new structure upon the basis of a loyal minority.167 In the punishment to be meted out betimes to the Red River tribes he, a Kansan by adoption, saw the possibility of relief for Kansas, relief, that is, from her Indian encumbrance. The forfeited and confis- cated Choctaw and Chickasaw lands would afford ex- cellent accommodation for the tribes whose knell as property-holders in the region consecrated to freedom had been sounded when the Kansas-Nebraska Bill with

165 Phillips to Dole, March 22, 1864, ibid., p. 328.

166 On Phillips' own confession, it is known that he circulated the proc- lamation with political intent among the recalcitrant Choctaws and Chicka- saws. He hoped it would "help to demoralize them, and prevent them from organizing as large a force of Indians against me as they otherwise would." (idem.)

167 This is, of course, generally conceded to have been President Lincoln's policy. For an exposition of it, see McCarthy, Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruc- tion, p. 193; Rhodes, History of the United States, vol. v, pp. 55-56; Nicolay and Hay, Complete W 'orks of Abraham Lincoln, vol. ii, pp. 672-675 ; Richard- son, vol. vi, pp. 189-191. Had the tragedy of April Fourteenth, 1865 never occurred it is highly improbable that Harlan and Cooley would have been permitted to consummate their iniquitous designs against the misguided Indians.

Cattle -Driving in the Indian Country 81

what a noted Kansan has so pertinently called its "glit- tering generalities" 168 had passed to its enactment. A successful termination to the Red River expedition would have meant a return of peace and security to the whole Indian Territory.169 The refugees would then have ceased to fret at their inchoate restoration. As it was, they remembered only too well that their un- alleviated sufferings 17° of the previous winter bade fair to be repeated and they dreaded that repetition. Their grain fields and their vegetable gardens were at that very moment being despoiled. Under the circum- stances, what of hope and trust had they to build upon? They murmured at the miserable incompleteness of their restoration and they chafed under the restraints that reduced them to penury. In Kansas, the tribes chafed likewise. Farm products were exceedingly scarce and their regular buffalo hunt had, because of the hostilities of the tribes of the plains, been per- emptorily forbidden.171 It was General Curtis' inten- tion to start a vigorous campaign against the Kiowas and raiders in complicity with them and he wanted, so he affirmed, to run no risks of confounding friends with foes, hence his order that peaceful hunters should stay at home, hungry though they might be, on their barren reservations. Their absolute dependence upon the hunt

IBS Gleed, Charles S., The Kansas Memorial, p. 143.

169 Cong. Globe, 38th cong., and sess., p. 1299. For what it might have meant to the whole Confederacy, see Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruc- tion, p. 189. Taylor, p. 196, says, "The Red River campaign of 1864 was the last Federal campaign undertaken for political objects, or intrusted to political generals."

170 For an account of the circumstances conditioning those sufferings see Smith to Coffin, July 16, 1863, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1863, pp. 211-213; Gookins to Coffin, October 17, 1863, ibid., p. 222; Harlan to Coffin, September 30, 1864, ibid., 1864, pp. 309-311.

171 Farnsworth to Dole, August u, 1864, O.I.A., General Files, Kansas, 1863-1868, Fi58; Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1864, p. 369.

82 The Indian Under Reconstruction

for a livelihood he chose to ignore. Their sufferings were a matter of indifference to him. Against the shortsightedness and arbitrariness of his order the In- dian Office protested, but in vain.172 Military exped- iency won the day but military effectiveness did not rid the country of the raiders.

While Agent Carruth was yet alive and caring for the Wichitas and other Leased District Indians, the accusation was first made that they were serving as " go-betweens," or middle-men, in the cattle-stealing enterprise. Late in July, 1864, Milo Gookins succeed- ed to the post made vacant by Carruth's decease, a circumstance rather fortunate, in a way, inasmuch as Gookins professed to be peculiarly competent to lift a goodly share of the responsibility for cattle-driving from Indian shoulders. Previous to his selection as Wichita agent, he had been on duty, under appoint- ment from the Indian office, with the Army of the Frontier. At Fort Gibson he was a special agent and in a position to make correct and interesting observa- tions of men and events. To a considerable degree he undoubtedly merited the confidence reposed in him; but he early developed the traditional animus of the civilian against the military chief and consequently a strong bias seems always to have vitiated most of his findings for the Indian service.

The cattle-driving business of the Indian country became the subject of official inquiry in the spring of 1864 and continued so at intervals thereafter for a per- iod of several years. It would seem that it was mainly upon the complaint of Milo Gookins 173 that the origi-

172 Dole to Usher, August 19, 1864, ibid., pp. 369-370.

173 Others had undoubtedly made complaints also; for, on February 16, 1864, Usher transmitted to Stanton copies of communications from Agent Justin Harlan "in relation to the conduct of the military officials in the

Cattle-Driving in the Indian Country 83

nal inquiry was started and he made his complaint "4 while he was still occupying his post of observation. Early in February, Colonel Phillips with detachments of the Indian Brigade had started out upon his expedi- tion in the direction of Red River, the expedition upon which he carried President Lincoln's amnesty procla- mation and made his appraisement of the existing In- dian disposition. On the return march, his force sepa- rated and each contingent pursued a different route. That under Major Foreman passed through a section of the Creek country that had been previously traversed and gathered up as it went between four and five hun- dred head of stray Indian cattle, from which, upon the arrival at Fort Gibson, the brigade quartermaster, Captain Chester Thomas, who was making up an ox- team for Fort Scott, selected about eighty head. Eu- chees, possibly Creeks, of the First Indian Home Guards being privileged to watch the proceedings, recognized the cattle as their own and laid claim ac- cordingly. The evidence consisted of private brands and so they had no great difficulty in establishing, to the satisfaction of the bystanders, their ownership. Thomas issued vouchers in acknowledgment of govern- ment indebtedness ; but, on one pretext or another, as Gookins in ex parte fashion reported it, delayed and ultimately refused payment. As a matter of fact, he had good ground for his refusal and was supported in it by both Foreman and Phillips ; for he had discovered that Perry Fuller, the contractor, was figuring as In- dian counsel, a self-constituted Indian claim agent,

region of country referred to." (A.G.O., Old Files Section, B 1013, V.S., 1863, 2 of 15). Usher claimed that President Lincoln and he knew Agent Harlan personally and could vouch for his intelligence and reliability.

174 Letter to Dole, March 8, 1864, O.I.A., General Files, Southern Su- perintendency, 1863-1864, G 121 ; Letter Book, no. 13, p. 351.

84 The Indian Under Reconstruction

and had induced his unsuspecting clients to make over to him one-half of the requisitioned and identified cattle.175 Large fees of the sort become scandalous when public attention is called to them ; but they have ever been but a mere phase, an incident only, of the white man's exploitation of his red brother.

The charges against Perry were the prelude of many to follow; but, in this instance, they were lodged only when the government took cognizance of Gookins' worse than innuendoes against army officers. Reported in regular sequence to Dole, to Usher, and to Stanton, those innuendoes, along with others from like sources and of like character, were finally referred to General Curtis for investigation and report.176 The die had been cast.

175 Chester Thomas, Captain and A.G.M., U.S. Vols., to Captain M. H. Insley, Chief Q.M., Dept. of Kansas, dated Ft. Leavenworth, May 7, 1864.

ire The burden of Curtis' report was to the effect "that the information, communicated to your (Usher's) Department, was erroneous, and the charges made against the officers of the United States Army entirely unfounded." (Stanton to Usher, May 26, 1864). Although Phillips was undoubtedly exculpated along with the rest, this fact is worthy of insertion here: In August, 1865, Daniel Childress, a Creek, made affidavit that he was detailed in February and March of 1864 by Colonel Phillips to drive cattle from the Indian country to lola, Kansas (General Files, Southern Su- Perintendency).

It was about the time that this investigation was going on that Phillips, disgusted with the whole course of events, resolved to retire from the service. His resignation was refused acceptance, however. Note the fol- lowing letter:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your endorsement

of the 28th ultimo, referring for acceptance the resignation of Col°. W.

A. Phillips, sd Indian Regiment.

"In reply, I am directed to inform you that the resignation was

referred to Major Gen1 Curtis, U.S. Vols., for his recommendation, who

returns the same with the following endorsement:

'Col°. Phillips is a good officer and I think he ought to remain in his

present Command. I cannot approve of his resignation'."

(A.A.G. to S. C. Pomeroy, April 26, 1864, A.G.O., Old Files Section, Personal Papers of W. A. Phillips).

Not until June 10, 1865 was Colonel Phillips officially discharged (ibid.).

Cattle-Driving in the Indian Country 85

The cattle stealing was a form of the very general evil of peculation and most unfortunately there stood insuperable obstacles in the way of its eradication. The chief of them was the existence of a political force be- hind the cattle thieves, a political force that radiated from Kansas and that had its stronghold in the army, in the Indian Office, and in the United States Senate. There were two sets of contractors and each had its own supporters in the public service. The set that Colonel Phillips was to take such exception to, the Mc- Donald 177 and Fuller firm, was the set that Blunt, when once restored to his old command, February twenty- seventh, had immediately endorsed and there is much reason to believe as did his detractors that it was its special interests that he was seeking to subserve when he issued, on April sixteenth, just prior to his own re- moval from Fort Smith back to Fort Leavenworth, the notorious military order, No. 7, notorious because of the opprobrium which the objections of influential In- dians and of Phillips' adherents called down upon it. The order 178 restricted the sale of Indian produce and brought within military jurisdiction emanating from Fort Smith the absolute disposal of Indian cattle. Among the Indian objectors were prominent men like John Ross 179 and Smith Christie,180 the former assured- ly enough of a patriot to make the insinuation that he

177 McDonald was a brother of Alexander McDonald, who was United States senator from Arkansas, 1868-1871.

ITS The great injustice of the order, as viewed by its opponents, is best set forth in a letter from W. L. G. Miller, a Cherokee by adoption, to Usher, April 23, 1864 (O.I.A., General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1863-1864, MZJI; I. D., Register of Letters Received, no. 4, p. 373). A copy of the order is filed with it in the Indian Office. The letter is too long for insertion here. It was referred to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, May 17, 1864.

179 John Ross and Evan Jones to Usher, July 29, 1864, !• D. Files,

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protested only because he had investments in the Ross sutler's store, against which Blunt's order discriminat- ed, seem at this distance of time utterly absurd. Despite the protests the order continued in force long after Blunt's authority had been removed. General Thayer, who had no reason to approve of its author, he being the one who had given Thayer what Curtis described as a "terrible castigation",181 pronounced in its favor,182 extolling its merits. Finally, early in August, opposi- tion to it took a new form and resolutions 183 purporting to have been unanimously adopted by the "Pin League" were given wide circulation through the newspapers. The rift in the lute was at last apparent; for they attempted no concealment of the differences ex- isting between Blunt and Phillips and openly charged the former with having been guilty of class legis- lation. The acting Cherokee agent, A. G. Proctor,184 inquired of Chief Downing as to their genuineness

Bundle, no. 52. See also letter from the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of War, August 16, 1864.

180 Dana to Usher, September 2, 1864, O.I.D., General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1863-1864,

181 Curtis to Blunt, April 17, 1864, Official Records, vol. xxxiv, part iii, p. 199.

182 Report of John M. Thayer, dated Fort Smith, August 10, 1864. Blunt's restrictive order covered also certain salines within the Cherokee country. The Interior Department, June 15, 1864, urged its modification out of deference to Indian wishes; but both Thayer and Halleck reported adversely (O.I.A., General Files, Cherokee, 1859-1865, W6i5). Smith Christie had protested earnestly against the salines being taken possession of by the military authorities for the uses of the army. For criticism of Blunt's order, other than Indian, see Official Records, vol. xxxiv, part 3, p. 213.

183 The resolutions, dated Fort Gibson, August 9, 1864, are on file in the Indian Office both in manuscript form and as printed in the newspapers. They represent a strong endorsement of Phillips and an equally strong denunciation of Blunt and the contractors. (O.I. A., Southern Superintend- ency).

184 On July n, 1864, Coffin wrote to Dole, asking his approval of the appointment of A. G. Proctor of Emporia, Kansas as Special Agent to

Cattle-Driving in the Indian Country 87

and received information that confirmed his own sus- picions;185 for presumably no one belonging to the Na- tion knew anything about them. Proctor's own pre- dilections stood revealed when this most re-assuring news he communicated without semblance of delay to McDonald and Fuller.186

Throughout the summer and autumn of 1864 re- crimination and counter-recrimination remained the order of the day. Almost coincident with the issuance of the "Pin League" resolutions, Phillips personally redoubled his efforts towards the suppression of the McDonald-Fuller influence. August second he ad- dressed Usher, strongly urging the expulsion from the Indian country of a certain Henry McKee, an agent of the firm.187 The firm itself he would have ordered out also and its license cancelled on account of gross abuse of privilege and the betrayal of public trust. He en- listed the services of General Thomas Ewing to the same end and Ewing informed Dole that Phillips ought by all means to be supported in his endeavors "to ex- pose and put down the robbers of the Indians."188 In- stead of support, however, he had received, August fifth, an order to turn over his command to Wattles and

assist Harlan, Cox having resigned (ibid., Cherokee, C 952 of 1864). John T. Cox was also a Kansan, from Coffey County. The specific reason for his resignation is not divulged; but, in September, 1864, he was presiding as chairman of the Kansas State Republican Convention, the convention at which Crawford was nominated for governor and Sidney Clark for congress- man (Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, p. 200). Proctor resigned as Special Agent in September and Coffin then asked for the approval of the appoint- ment of W. A. Harlan (O.I. A., Cherokee, C 1044 of 1864) ; but Proctor was still officiating late in the autumn, but as acting agent only.

185 Lewis Downing, Acting Principal Chief, to Proctor, October 28, 1864 (ibid., Southern Superintendency).

186 Proctor to McDonald & Fuller, November 30, 1864, ibid.

187 Phillips to Usher, August 2, 1864, I. D. Files, Bundle, no. 52; Register of Letters Received, "Indians," no. 4, p. 425.

iss Ewing to Dole, dated Headquarters, St. Louis District, September i, 1864 (O.I.A., Land Files, Southern Superintendency, 1855-1870, 1 711).

The Indian Under Reconstruction

to report himself at Fort Smith. Phillips believed the contractors to be at the bottom of even that action.185 Energetic in their own interests they obviously were. Their devotion to their friend, Blunt, instigated an at- tack upon General Steele. They adjudged it wrong to detach Indian Territory from Kansas and they begged that Blunt might be put in command at Fort Gibson. His presence alone would be worth two thousand men.190 There were Indians, on the other hand, who had had enough of Blunt and wanted no more of him. Opposing Phillips and exerting all possible influ- ence in behalf of the contractors were the field em- ployees of the Indian Office and yet nobody knew bet- ter than they that abuses existed and that the cattle- thieving business was flourishing unchecked. It was in all parts the same. The Confederates 191 had it to con- tend with as had the Federals and yet everywhere were the indigents 192 and the suffering refugees. The whole situation was deplorable.

189 Phillips to Ewing, August 17, 1864, ibid.

190 Perry Fuller to Usher, September 22, 1864 (ibid., Southern Su- perintendency, 1863-1864). Fuller accused Steele of inefficiency and his troops of demoralization. The National Union, October 15, 1864 had this to say in eulogy of Steele,

"There is no officer in the army who is more free from the breath of suspicion in regard to speculations or using his position as a means of acquiring wealth ..."

191 "Major Gen1 Maxey directs me to write to you in relation to captured mules & now being carried to Texas. On the march from Perry- ville to this point many of the men of Gano's Brigade left the command without permission and are said to have driven off mules, branded U.S. and other brands placed on sutlers' mules captured from the enemy at Cabin Creek. In some instances it is reported that the brands had been obliterated by burning or cutting the hair. Of course this property will be claimed by the Government and belong to this District ..." (Portlock to In- spector-general, Bonham, Oct. 13, 1864, A.G.O., Confederate Archives, chap. 2, no. 259, no. 81, p. 64).

192 P. P. Pitchlynn to Maxey, December 29, 1864 (Official Records, vol. liii, supplement, p. 1035; Maxey to Boggs, December 31, 1864, ibid, p. 1034).

Cattle-Driving in the Indian Country 89

In the course of time, Phillips, still without com- mand, filed formal charges against the contractors and, in a document, dated November 30, 1864, they attempt- ed an answer in rebuttal.193 The case hung fire, so to speak, all through the winter; but Phillips went on amassing his evidence while Coffin and other govern- ment agents made a feint of rooting out the illicit traf- fic in Indian cattle.194

With the beginning of 1865, a strong reaction against the evildoers set in. Phillips was again in control at Gibson 1S5 and for once the commander there and at Fort Smith were on a co-operative basis. Simultan- eously almost they issued restrictions 198 upon trade

193O.I.A., General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1865,

194 Coffin to Dole, September 12, 1864 (ibid.). Coffin averred that he had had, since May i, 1864, a detective at work ferreting out information, which he would report upon later. The detective was apparently George A. Reynolds (Coffin to Dole, April 14, 1865, ibid., Ci328). Coffin secured the co-operation of General Curtis. On this same general subject, see Office Letter of September 5, 1864.

195 Concerning his return to command, Phillips had this to say, when writing to General Herron, January 16, 1865 (Official Records, vol. xlviii, part i, pp. 542-543).

". . . The order to proceed to Wahington I did not receive, but late one night 1 was summoned to General Thayer's headquarters and received orders to resume command of the Indian Brigade. They were reticent, and I sought to know no more than they thought proper to communicate. I assumed command on the 29th ultimo ..." The Indians had begged for his restoration. See petition of the succes- sor of Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la, dated December 23, 1864. (O.I.A., Southern Su- periniendency, 1865). It was transmitted by John Ross to President Lincoln, February 15, 1865.

196 "£he restrictions issued by Phillips were comprehended in General Orders, no. 4, dated from Fort Gibson, January 14, 1865. They are to be found in I. D. Files, Bundle, no. 53, and in Official Records, vol. xlviii, part i, pp. 516-519. In reporting upon his order to General Canby, February 16, 1865, Phillips said, "... I, however, desired to secure through you sufficient protection from the department above to stop the nefarious system which appears to have a thorough organization in the State of Kansas . . . The case of the Indian Nation is peculiar. The Secretary of the Treasury decided that 'it was not a State in rebellion,' and con- sequently sends no Treasury agents here. The question as to what is con-

90 The Indian Under Reconstruction

operations. Rigorously they enforced a rule of the Treasury Department "allowing only three thousand dollars to be introduced per month inside of the line of Rebel States," and against that action McDonald and Fuller filed their protest 19T Phillips soon renewed his charges against them,198 definitely this time impli- cating agents of the Indian Office whom he accused of being in collusion with the contractors in their "nefar- ious transactions." February third, Phillips added to his charges by informing the Secretary of the Interior that an effort was about to be made to get "friends of the corrupt money corporation put in as Indian agents."199 Perry Fuller, for instance, had already come forward as a candidate for the Creek agency. By this time Phillips had incontrovertible evidence to sub-

traband has been held in abeyance, as I understand it. The order was therefore framed to meet the exigencies of the case ..."

197 McDonald & Fuller to Usher, January 12, 1865 [I. D. Files, Bundle, n°- 53 (January to May, 1865)]; ibid., (Register of Letters Received) "In- dians," no. 4, p. 376).

198 Phillips to Usher, January 17, 1865; same to same, February 4, 1865 (I. D. Files, Bundle, no. 53; Register of Letters Received, "Indians," no. 4. Phillips' letter of January i7th bears the Indian Office file-mark, Southern Superintendency, P. 309.

199 Phillips to Usher, February 3, 1865 (I. D. Files, Bundle, no. 53; Register of Letters Received, "Indians," no. 4, p. 427). With this letter is filed Lieutenant Houston Benge's report to Phillips, dated February 4, 1865. On February 6th, McDonald and Fuller filed their reply to the charges contained in Phillips's letter of January i7th. The firm name is now given as, McDonald, Fuller, McKee & Co. On the 2oth Usher had interrogated them regarding the quantity of goods shipped by them under permits from the Treasury and War departments. They had replied the following day. On the 7th of February, A. B. Eaton, Commissary General of Subsistence, inquired of Usher regarding their contracts (O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, £63; I. D. Files, Bundle, no. 53). February 21, 1865, Dana, Assistant-secretary of war, communicated to Usher the information that General Herron's report relative to their transactions had been trans- mitted to Congress. On the 23rd, the firm preferred charges against Phil- lips and requested that a Court of Inquiry be instituted before which they might plead their case. They demanded that Phillips' charges should be ignored entirely unless supported by competent evidence (ibid.).

Cattle-Driving in the Indian Country 91

stantiate his every indictment; for Lieutenant Houston Benge, Provost Marshal, especially authorized under General Order, No. 4, had made some investigations with astonishing results.

The accused Indian agents rallied to their own de- fense and to defence of their superior officer, Super- intendent Coffin;200 but his had been conduct not so easy of exoneration.201 Beef and corn contracts 202 were

200 Cutler to Usher, February 9, 1865 (O.I.A., General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1865, €1233; I.D., Register of Letters Received, "Indians," no. 4, p. 206) ; Coffin to Dole, May 17, 1865, enclosing reports of Agent Harlan and others (O.I.A., General Files, Southern Superintendency). May 27, 1865, Dole reported to Secretary Harlan (ibid., Report Book, no. 14, pp. 285-286) testifying to the efficiency and good conduct of Agent H. W. Martin, whom he had known personally and intimately for twenty years. Subsequently, on June i4th, (ibid., p. 317) he recommended, on similar grounds, that Isaac Coleman, Justin Harlan, and Milo Gookins be continued as agents. Charges of dishonesty, involving the contractors, Carney and Stevens, were preferred, July 5, 1866, against Martin (N. P. Chipman to D. N. Cooley, July 5, 1866, ibid., General Files, Sac and Fox, 1862-1866, C 318. See also C 361, 1667, M4O7, M4t>9, W45s). Agent Elder seems to have thought that Curtis condoned the stealing of cattle (Elder to Chess, January 12, 1865, Official Records, vol. xlviii, part i, p. 872).

201 The beginning of the next year, Coffin was called upon to render an account of what he had done with hides and tallow of beef cattle, slaughtered for the refugees (Cooley to Coffin, January 8, 1866, O.I.A., Letter Book, no. 79, p. 101 ; Cooley to Harlan, January 17, 1866, ibid., Report Book, no. 15, p. 45). Concerning the permits that he had granted, see Coffin to Hamilton, September 22, 1864, Official Records, vol. xlviii, part i, pp. 872-873; Phillips to Pope, February 16, 1865, ibid., pp. 873-874; Joel Moody to Phillips, August 22, 1864, ibid., p. 873. Additional material in the case against Coffin can be found in the following letters: Harlan to Cooley, January 29, 1866, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, 159 of 1866; Dole to Coffin, February 2, 1866, ibid., C 45 of 1866; D. R. Anthony to Har- lan, February 5, 1866 and Sidney Clarke to Harlan, February 5, 1866, ibid., C 64 of 1866; Henry Smith to Harlan, February 10, 1866, ibid., 8122 of 1866; Coffin to Cooley, February 6, 1866, ibid., C 55 of 1866. In the letter last cited and in an affidavit of February 2, 1866, Coffin endeavored to explain his conduct. He claimed that he had, indeed, disposed of the hides and tallow; but had used the proceeds, over five thousand dollars, in purchas- ing supplies for refugees [ibid., C 44 of 1866].

202 Phillips to Herron, January 16, 1865, op. cit. Cutler to Coffin, April 16, 1865, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1865, pp. 274-275.

92 The Indian Under Reconstruction

coupled with the cattle stealing in the list of Phillips' accusations and Usher intimated a wish for a thorough overhauling.205 It was well he did for other forces were already at work with a similar end in view.

Beginning with the spring of the last year of the war, the State of Kansas undertook, on a large scale, to in- vite immigrants within her borders.204 Somewhat in the fashion of William Penn in old colonial days she advertised her resources far and wide. The law and order party strove for ascendancy. Governor Craw- ford took office January ninth and just one week later legislators from the southwestern part of the state ap- proached him on the matter of the Indian cattle steal- ing, which must be put a stop to or the settlers already there would depart.205 The legislators solicited Craw- ford's good offices in making proper representations to the Federal government regarding the wide range of the traffic. Almost coincidently Senator Pomeroy, February twenty-fifth, introduced a resolution calling for copies of all licenses that had been issued relative to trade in the Indian country.206 The report on the same was forthcoming from the Interior Department, March first,207 and, on March third, a provision making cattle-

203 Usher to Dole, February 10, 1865 (O.I.A., General Files, Southern Superintendency) . See also Dole to Coffin, February 14, 1865, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, p. 270.

204 Kansas in the Sixties, pp. 215, 227.

205 R. H. Abraham and others to Crawford, January 16, 1865 (A.G.O., Fort Gibson File Box, 1864-1868; Official Records, vol. xlviii, part i, pp. 1133-1134). For Crawford's account of the cattle-stealing, see Kansas in the Sixties, pp. 204, 208. There were other disorders that called for prompt action. See W. G. Brewer to Curtis, dated Mapleton, January 24, 1865, regarding "property smuggled out of Missouri and run up the Osage River." (Fort Gibson File Box, 1864-1868).

206 Cong. Globe, 38th cong., 2nd sess., p. 1088.

207 Dole to Usher, February 28, 1865, I. D. Files, Bundle, no. 53; Cong. Globe, 38th cong., 2nd sess., p. 1219.

Cattle-Driving in the Indian Country 93

stealing a felony punishable by heavy fine or imprison- ment or both became law.208 A loophole for further abuses was, however, embodied in the selfsame measure since each agent was invested with discretionary power, under regulations of the Interior Department, to sell Indian stock for Indian benefit and was forbidden to interfere with the execution of orders lawfully issued for supplying army needs from the same Indian pro- duct.

All this time, although under grave suspicion him- self, Coffin had prosecuted his inquiries into the source and extent of the illicit traffic. He had secured the preceding year the very efficient services of George A. Reynolds and, upon the basis of reports that Reynolds as secret agent made, he offered, in April, new evi- dence in the case against the army officers.209 The In- dians meanwhile were growing more and more resent- ful ; for the refugees were, if anything, in a more dis- tressful state than ever, on the very verge of starva- tion.210

Indian Territory had now been included once again in Blunt's command,211 a circumstance which, in the light of past events, was a bad augury for the cleaning of the Augean stables. In May, Coffin was superseded by Sells, who, having been an employee of the Treasury Department previously,212 probably had some inside

208 it was embodied in the concluding sections of the Indian Appropria- tion bill (13 United States Statutes at Large, p. 563).

209 Coffin to Dole, April 14, 1865 (O.I.A., General Files, Southern Su- perintendency, 1865, €1328). Reynolds' report was dated Fort Scott, March 20, 1865.

210 Official Records, vol. xlviii, part 2, pp. 117, 136, 177, 295.

211 Pope notified Blunt, April 7th that he was to include Indian Territory in his command (ibid., p. 46).

212 Sells had been Third Auditor of the Treasury under Chase (Davis, Elijah Sells, Annals of loiva, 3rd series, vol. ii, p. 522).

94 The Indian Under Reconstruction

knowledge of the corrupt practices obtaining in the southern superintendency. He retained the services of Secret Agent Reynolds 213 and added to them the mili- tary furnished by Generals Mitchell and Dodge,214 who were both untiring in their efforts to destroy the cattle- stealing traffic. Meanwhile Phillips did his best to relieve the necessities of the refugees. He induced them to plant sufficient corn to secure them against star- vation 215 and he protected them, to the limits of his ability in the possession of what little remained to them of their live-stock.

With the surrender of Kirby Smith and the Trans- Mississippi Department, the indigent Indians within the late Confederate lines became an additional charge upon the southern superintendency and it taxed the en- ergies of both civil and military authorities, co-operat- ing with each other at last, to prevent further spolia- tion.2" Even Blunt,217 contrary to expectations, set to

213 Sells to Reynolds, May 30, 1865, O.I.A., General Files, Southern Su- perintendency, 1865, S68i; Sells to Dole, June 7, 1865, ibid. Before long Reynolds became agent for the Seminoles.

214 It was discouraging work and there were times when Dodge at least despaired of accomplishing the great end sought. On one occasion, August 12, 1865, he wrote to Pope that it seemed to him as if "all the rascals in the West are combined to swindle Government." (Official Records, vol. xlviii, part ii, p. 1179).

215 Phillips to General J. J. Reynolds, April 19, 1865, I. D. Files, Bundle, no. 53. On conditions among the refugees in and around Fort Gibson, see Captain J. S. McClintock's report of issues made to them for the month of May (O.I. A., Southern Superintendency, M725) ; Office letter to McClin- tock, August 22, 1865; J. J. Reynolds to Harlan, July 15, 1865 (I. D. Files, Bundle, no. 54). Opoethleyoholo's family was among the refugees.

216 The want of harmony had been very demoralizing and had created conditions perplexing in the extreme. On the relations between the two departments, see Official Records, vol. xlviii, part ii, pp. 742, 933-935, 986, 1153, etc. Better things were hoped for when Harlan became Secretary of the Interior. July 27th the new commissioner, D. N. Cooley, sent out a circular letter bespeaking co-operation [O.I.A., Letter Book, no. 77, p. 519].

217 There is much evidence of Blunt's activities. The following indicate

Cattle-Driving in the Indian Country 95

with a will to restrain the lawless who, for so long, had had things almost entirely their own way. Some spe- cial agents were appointed by the Indian Office and some very necessary changes made in the regular force; but the work of all was more than supplemented by that of the provost-marshals,218 who patrolled the country in

their nature: Blunt to Herman H. Heath, Provost-Marshall, March 9, 1865, Official Records, vol. xlviii, part i, pp. 1132-1133; Heath to Blunt, March 16, 1865, A.G.O., Fort Gibson File Box, 1864-1868. Heath testified that "gangs of men have banded together on the southwest border (of Kansas) for illicit trade and perhaps plunder ..." A lot of cattle had been seized by one of Blunt's scouts. May 16, 1866, Blunt suggested to Harlan [I. D. Files, Bundle, no. 56] that a commission should be appointed to investigate the Indian cattle stealing that had been going on since the Spring of 1862 and notoriously so.

218 Among the most energetic of the provost-marshals were two deserving of special mention; viz., Leroy J. Beam, lieutenant, i5th Kansas and assistant provost-marshal for the District of South Kansas, and Lieutenant George Williams, provost-marshal for the District of North Kansas. An order had been issued revoking all passes and permits and apparently the thieves tried to get away with their ill-gotten gains before it could be executed. Beam found one man, Samuel Hartsel, in possession of four hundred and seventy cattle that some Indians had driven out of the Territory (Beam to Wm. H. Hewett, dated Camp Blair, Eureka, Kansas, March 20, 1865, A.G.O., Fort Gibson File Box, 1864-1868). Lieutenant Williams was detailed by the War Department at the request of the Indian Office to proceed to Kansas especially "to investigate certain alleged frauds" in the Interior Department. He employed B. B. Mitchell as a detective (Taylor to Browning, February 6, 1869, O.I. A., Report Book, no. 18, p. 151) Mitchell started out the very day he received Williams' telegram of instructions and according to his own story he proceeded "to Council Grove, Kansas, for the purpose of observing the movements of persons engaged in stealing and receiving Indian cattle. With the same object I subsequently visited the counties of Shawnee, Morris, Chase, Lyon and Butler.

"After the most careful and thorough investigation I am convinced that for the present no more cattle are being brought from the Indian Country to this part of the state. Those who have been engaged in this business are deterred by the vigor which the Department is show- ing in putting it down from continuing their operations. From the same reason many persons who have had contraband and stolen In- dian stock in their possession have turned it loose, while others though still exercising supervision over such animals are unwilling to acknowl- edge the ownership. I ascertained that there were many small herds of this character, numbering from ten head to four or five each, on

96 The Indian Under Reconstruction

the interests of law and order. It was no easy matter to apprehend the offenders, especially when the failure of the Fort Smith Council widened, as it was inevitably bound to do, the breach between the tribal factions.

In October, Superintendent Sells prepared his first annual report 219 and had much to say regarding the cattle-stealing, a regular system as he had found it to be. It was a system that had two kinds of operators, those who seized the cattle on the original range and those who received them at the border and had charge of their final disposition. Cattle brokers, Sells called the latter, and it was they who constituted the strength of the system ; for their number, social standing and in- fluence 22° were such, " that it was almost fatal to inter-

the Neosho and Cottonwood Rivers ..." (O.I. A., General Files,

Central Superintendency, 1863-1868).

Williams also employed Lieutenant James H. Clark as a detective under himself. Clark reported, August i, 1865, on the way cattle were still being driven from the Indian Territory. Citizens in the vicinity of Hum- boldt had tried to get him to fail in his duty in following up the stolen herds (ibid., Southern Superintendency, 1865, Wi2i8). In the autumn, under date of October 10, 1865, Williams sent in to Cooley a full report on the result of his investigations (ibid.).

H. E. McKee, who, April 20, 1865, had replied to Phillips' charges about the fraudulent corn contracts (McKee to Coffin, April 20, 1865) and again, in August, when Lieutenant-colonel St. Clair was detailed to look into the matter (McKee to St. Clair, August 18, 1865) professed to be highly indig- nant when stolen herds grazing in the Neosho Valley were assigned to his ownership. He could hardly believe he said "that anybody would dare to drive cattle from Indian Territory on his credit ; "for he was a licensed trader. He swore that he had never had any interest whatsoever in cattle (McKee to Sells, dated Fort Gibson, October 16, 1865).

Sells, July 19, 1865, in a report to Cooley, testified also to the herds, unaccounted for, that were held in southern Kansas and he emphasized "the importance of procuring from the Hon. Sec? of War an order directing Gen1 Mitchell, Com^g the Dist. of Kansas, to seize and hold for investiga- tion of title all cattle and ponies, supposed to be Indian stock, and especially a lot of from 300 to 400 head in the possession of Coffin ..." On this matter, see Report to the Secretary of the Interior, July 20, 1865.

219 Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1865, pp. 252-ff.

220 Lane's name was among those connected with the contract frauds.

Cattle -Driving in the Indian Country 97

pose obstacles in the way of their success." It was reckoned that, in the course of the war, fully three hun- dred thousand head of Indian cattle had been stolen. The vigorous measures that Sells and his coadjutors instituted accomplished much in the discrediting of the traffic and the limiting of its operations; but it was years notwithstanding before it finally disappeared and 221 with it the " Knights of the Brush."

The insinuation against him appeared in the Chicago Tribune and he held Phillips responsible for it. George W. Deitzler, one of the contractors with Perry Fuller, was the authority upon which Phillips based his accusation (Speer, Life of Gen. James H. Lane, 313-314). McDonald and likewise Fuller testified to Lane's innocence (Johnson Papers, vol. 96). The follow- ing letter is Fuller's affidavit:

"... It gives me pleasure to state that I am the active business partner of the firms of McDonald & Co. & Fuller & Co., principal contractors for furnishing goods and supplies for the Southern Indian Superintendency, and I aver that not only have you never been paid a dollar from either of the firms represented by me or any other person for you or for your benefit but that no proposition or suggestion was ever at any time made to secure to you or for your benefit any sum of money, any share of the profits or any other consideration for any services you have rendered us in your public or private capac- ity ...' (Perry Fuller to Gen. James H. Lane, dated Washing- ton City, D.C., May 28, 1866, Johnson Papers, vol. 96). Preston B. Plumb had presumably some interest in cattle driving. It was while he was lieutenant in the Eleventh Kansas Infantry. No direct charge against him has been substantiated; but a man, who lived a few years ago and for a short time only in Elkton, Maryland, claimed that, under orders from the young lieutenant, he, personally, drove cattle up from the Indian country into Kansas.

221 The amount of material on the subject is enormous. The following citations illustrate the various sources from which it can be obtained :

J. B. Luce to Cooley, August n, 1865, O.I.A., General Files, Choctaiv, 1859-1866, L 762 ; Letters from Major Morrow, Fort Clark, Texas, ibid., Central Superintendency, W 525 of 1872; Enoch Hoag to J. T. Gibson, July 5, 1870. ibid., District of Nebraska Letter Book, vol. i, pp. 254-255; Documents transmitted by Hancock, May 27, 1867, ibid., Miscellaneous Files; Henry J. Hunt to John Levering, October 9, 1865, ibid., General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1865, L 805 ; Cooley to Gen. J. M. Hedrick, June 4, 1866, ibid., Letter Book, no. 80, p. 299; Lewis C. True to John N. Craig, October 9, 1865, A.G.O., Archives Division, Fort Gibson Letter Book, no. 20, p. 107; True to H. D. B. Cutler, October 19, 1865, ibid., p. 109.

IV. THE MUSTER OUT OF THE INDIAN HOME GUARDS

The cattle stealing business could never have grown and flourished unchecked until it made of itself a sys- tem, regular and gigantic in its operations, had the United States government afforded to the Indians the military protection that its own domestic war had made so vitally necessary. The protection, whatever its occasion, had been guaranteed by treaties, a point to be fatally lost sight of when the final account was ren- dered in 1866; but one that, in the interests of histori- cal justice, if not of legal, cannot be too strongly em- phasized. Furthermore, the protection ought assuredly to have been furnished by a competent armed force, by which is implied, not men of the frontier, recruited from the locality, wild and lawless, and certainly not Indian warriors, transformed, for the time being, into a Home Guard, but the highly trained of the regular army, having the best of its traditions to guide them, disinterested men, devoted to duty. In ante-bellum days, it had been the professional soldiers who invari- ably constituted the frontier defense, the famous dra- goons for example, and more than one commander that later distinguished himself on a Civil War battlefield, especially on the Confederate side, had won his spurs in an Indian fight. Protection against both domestic and foreign foes had been among the great inducements held out to the southern tribes for the accomplishment of their removal westward. Truly enough, a United

ioo The Indian Under Reconstruction

States civil war was not then anticipated not even though its underlying cause when it did come was the very same thing that had driven the Indians across the Mississippi. The coming, in no sense, diminished the government obligation and never was it at any time in contemplation that the exiles should themselves supply the protective force promised to them.

In eighteen sixty-three, and four and five, they were, however, supplying that force and, as was to have been expected, it was an exceedingly poor one. Colonel Phillips might make his charges against contractors and agents and might parry the thrust they made against him in their counter-charges; but, in one point, he was always indefensible. That point was his In- dian Brigade, which, in the later days of the war partic- ularly, was more often under fire of criticism than of rifle. To its incompetency was to be ascribed much of the wretchedness that had come to be the ordinary lot of the refugees. The Indian soldiers were condemned by one who knew them fairly well, Lieutenant-colonel Fred W. Schaurte 222 of the second regiment, as lazy, ignorant and irresponsible.223 They were constantly deserting, going home to their miserable and suffering families, and then returning to the ranks, oblivious of having offended, but disgruntled and demoralized. They had their vindicators 224 as well as their harsh

222 According to Special Indian Agent, John T. Cox, Schaurte was "very hostile to the Indians generally." (Cox to Coffin, December 5, 1863 O.I. A., Cherokee, €633).

223 Report to General Thomas, dated Camp Williams, C.N., August 31, 1863, A.G.O., Old Files Section, S 1963 (V.S.) 1863, Jacket i of 15.

224 See a letter of General Blum's, dated February 9, 1863, in reference to reports condemnatory of the Indian regiments. Blunt's testimony was distinctly favorable and should be cited in proof of their courage, their loyalty, their helplessness, their neglect by the U.S. Government, their service, etc. ("Extract of Letter and Endorsement Book," in Consolidated Indian Home Guard Papers, 61013 (V.S.) 1863, Jacket 2 of 15).

Muster Out of Indian Home Guards 101

See also, in the same collection, many letters issuing from the pen of Phillips, who was the Indian soldier's most fearless advocate. Two of the letters in particular are worthy of mention, one, of date, December 10, 1863, the other, to President Lincoln, transmitted by Congressman A. C. Wilder, of date, January 4, 1864. They were written when the mustering out of the Indian Brigade was under consideration and opinions were being called for. The letter to the president is here quoted:

"As Commanding Officer of the Brigade which includes the Indian Regiments, I desire to call to your personal attention the condition of that little understood and too much neglected Command.

"I have forwarded a report of the condition of the Indian Regiments in response to a request for evidence on the proposition of mustering them out. I send an additional copy to you through Mr. Wilder.

"The Indian Command as an 'experiment' has been entitled to more consideration than it has received. A portion of the Army Officials (honestly no doubt) have been opposed to it from its inception. No general system has been adopted. It has been to a large extent the victim of accidents. The white troops from States have officials to fight for their interests and honor. While the Indian Regiments have really done more effective service than any others I ever knew, no State has been concerned to vindicate their glory or redress their sufferings. In their behalf I appeal to your Excellency.

"Should the Government have determined or should it determine to muster them out of the service, every facility will be heartily furnished by the officers of the Command, who, I fear, would more cheerfully listen to propositions to muster them out than to reorganize them. They were once more hopeful. When I returned to them eight months ago, after a sickness of Small Pox, caught with them, I found every one discouraged. Gen1. Blunt, who once eulogized them, did them much less than justice. He held out hopes of promotion in Negro Regiments to all who were ambitious, and the ambition and sense of duty of these young men, whom I had picked from able sergeants and privates of white regiments, was the only element of power I had to induce them to work in so arduous a task. It was said the regiments would surely be mustered out. So long as they existed such a thing must be fatal to them.

"I had expected to get a white brigade at Fort Smith, but as this Command was going to pieces they sent me back. I found not an ounce of flour in the Commissary, the Command 400 sacks in debt to the Indian Department. No forage. The mules dead or dying. The white troops that had been with the command received 8000 starving refugees in the vicinity of the camp. Hundreds of cases of Small Pox. The white officers discouraged. No cavalry even for pickets. The Rebels threatening to take Gibson and ravaging the country.

"It has been my fortune, and I do not repine at it, to assume some severe tasks since I took my share in this War, but this was the most discouraging. I have (been) able with the most meagre re-

IO2 The Indian Under Reconstruction

critics and calumniators,225 however, and their military record, taken all in all, was not destitute of merit or of

sources to get bread